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INFORMED CONSENT TO
ABORTION:
A REFINEMENT
Thomas L. Jipping*
Much controversy has ensuedfrom the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
that a woman has a fundamentalconstitutionalright to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy by abortion. The efforts of state legislaturesto regulate abortion in
various ways have given rise to many questions regarding what this right actually is
and how it may best be protected. One such effort towardstate regulation has been
the establishment of informed consent laws which require the physician to present
certain information to the pregnant woman beforeperforming an abortion.
This Article examines and rejects the contention thatphysicianshave a right to be
free from government regulation in theirpractice of medicine. It then looks at the
nature of the abortion right, the nature of abortion, and the context in which the
abortion right is exercised Finally, it concludes that a framework focusing on the
rightsof women rather than physiciansand employing an "unduly burdensome" test
anda broaddefinition of "health" would best help courts to assess the constitutionality of informed consent statutes.

I.

INTRODUCTION:

A

GENERAL CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME

COURT'S ABORTION DOCTRINE

T

HE SUPREME COURT of the United States declared in 1973
that "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate'her pregnancy" is a fundamental constitutional right protected against unjustified state interference by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.1 The Court also recognized that two "sepa* B.A., Calvin College (1983); J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo (1987);
M.A., State University of New York at Buffalo (1988); Ph.D. candidate, State University of
New York at Buffalo. The author wishes to thank Professor Richard Myers of the Case
Western Reserve University School of Law and Professor Lynn Wardle of the Brigham
Young University School of Law for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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rate and distinct" state interests are implicated in the abortion context-one in maternal health and one in fetal life. These interests
are at all times
at least "important" 2 and each eventually becomes
"compelling." 3 The Court developed a trimester framework of
rules, a "model statute" in Professor Alexander Bickel's words4 to
balance this fundamental right and these state interests. This
framework in fact leaves the states little room to actually protect
preborn human life.5
Not only are increasingly significant state interests at stake in
2. Id. at 162.
3. Id. at 163.
4. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 28 (1975). See also J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 27 (1979).

5. A state may, even potentially, proscribe abortion only during the third trimester of
pregnancy, or after the preborn child is considered viable by the abortionist. Roe, 410 U.S. at
164-65. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979) (Court held that a Pennsylvania statute which imposed a strict standard of care on a physician if the fetus "may be
viable" was unconstitutional because this standard deviated from the standard established in
Roe.); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Held a provision of a Missouri
statute, which required the physician to preserve the fetus' life and health regardless of the
stage of pregnancy, to be unconstitutional). Even then, however, a state may not prohibit
abortions "necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother." Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added). In Roe's companion case, the
Supreme Court construed "health," as a reason justifying abortion, to mean anything "relevant to the well-being of the patient." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
Professor Lynn Wardle argues that this very broad definition of "health" from Doe applies to the reasons a woman would seek a first-trimester abortion but that a more restrictive
definition applies to the third-trimester concerns that can still result in an abortion despite the
Court's holding that states can prohibit them during late pregnancy. L. WARDLE, THE
ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE: A COMPENDIUM AND CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL COURT
ABORTION CASES 7-18 (1980). This distinction may be intuitively appealing, and may help
construct a framework with more logical coherence than the Court's actually has, but the
Court itself made no such distinction.
Since the very reason a woman would seek an abortion itself relates to her well-being,
even during the third trimester a state is effectively prevented from ever proscribing abortion.
See R. ADAMEK, ABORTION AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1982)

("Given this broad definition of the components of health, the Court in effect legalized abortion in the third trimester as well."); J. NOONAN, supra note 4, at 12 ("The restriction on the
[abortion] liberty appeared to be illusory. For the nine months of life within the womb the
child was at the [mother's] disposal-with two restrictions: She must find a licensed clinic
after month three; and after her child was viable, she must find an abortionist who believed
she needed an abortion."); Stone, Judges as MedicalDecision Makers: Is the Cure Worse Than
the Disease?, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 579, 580 (1984-85) (This author asserts that "Of course,
the Chief Justice [in his Roe concurrence] turned out to be completely wrong: the consequences predicted by the dissent were as accurate as any judicial prediction can be. As Justice White correctly interpreted the decision, 'any woman is entitled to an abortion at her
request if she is able to find a medical adviser willing to undertake the procedure.' ") (footnote omitted); Balch, Roe v. Wade: Abortion Is Legal Throughout Pregnancy 1 (1983)
("Under the Supreme Court decisions of [Roe and Doe], it is constitutionally impossible for
any state to prohibit abortions at any time during pregnancy.").
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the abortion context, but public opinion has also consistently
favored abortion regulation. Both opponents and proponents of
abortion claim the support of public opinion. However, a careful
analysis of relevant research shows that, with respect to both the
acceptable reasons for obtaining an abortion and the period during
pregnancy when abortion for any reason is acceptable, public opinion does not support the breadth of the abortion policy established
by the Supreme Court in 1973. Reasons other than the life or physical health of the woman or a pregnancy resulting from rape, situations which amount to fewer than two percent of abortions
currently performed in the United States,6 do not fird support from
a majority of Americans. 7 In general abortion beyond the first trimester fails to garner substantial public support.8 Sociologist Raymond Adamek concluded, in his study of popularly cited opinion
polls, that less than ten percent of abortions currently being performed in the United States have majority public approval. 9 Today,
after 15 years of widely available legal abortion and many Supreme
Court decisions to back up the notion that abortion is a fundamental constitutional right,"0 less than a quarter of the American people
favor unrestricted access to legalized abortion."
Public opinion and state interest have combined to prompt continuing efforts by state legislatures to regulate abortion. These efforts have been challenged in nearly two dozen Supreme Court
cases. 2 In his 1982 analysis, Professor Lynn Wardle examined
more than 145 additional reported decisions by the lower federal
6. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
7. R. ADAMEK, supra note 5, at 5 ("The middle majority... believes that abortion
should be legal only for hard reasons of life/serious health threat or rape/incest.").
8. Id. ("only a minority approves of abortion beyond the first three months").
9. Id.
10. Researchers commonly find that changes in the law affect public opinion, at least in
the short run. See Arney & Trescher, Trends in Attitudes Toward Abortion, 1972-75, 8 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 117, 124 (1976); Granberg & Granberg, Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1980: Trends
and Determinants, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSp. 250, 252 (1980). In view of this fact, one might
think that repeated Supreme Court rulings upholding the constitutional significance and
breadth of the abortion right would strengthen public support for it.
11. See ConstitutionalAmendments Relating to Abortion: Hearings on S.J. Res. 17, S.J.
Res. 18, S.J.Rea 19, andS.J. Res. 110 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 890 (1981) (testimony of sociologist Raymond
Adamek) [hereinafter Hearings]; Francome, Abortion Politicsin the United States, 28 POL.
STUD. 613, 616 (1980); America's Abortion Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at 22.
12. Most recently, on December 14, 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed, by a 4-4 vote,
the judgment of the Seventh Circuit invalidating a portion of the Illinois Parental Notice of
Abortion Act. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987). The Supreme Court denied the
State of Illinois' petition for a rehearing. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 1064 (1988).
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courts dealing with substantive abortion issues. 13 Nevertheless, the
parameters of permissible state abortion regulation are still far from
clear. The Supreme Court's abortion doctrine remains unsettled,
fraught with ambiguity and inconsistency. Its abortion decisions,
and Roe in particular, continue to be sharply criticized by a growing
minority of Supreme Court justices14 and, to an almost unprecedented degree, by scholars spanning the political horizon."
13. L. WARDLE, supra note 5, at xiii.
14. The Court voted 7-2 to overturn Texas' anti-abortion statute in 1973. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court voted 6-3 to overturn the city of Akron's anti-abortion
ordinance ten years later. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983). The Court voted 5-4 to overturn Pennsylvania's anti-abortion statute in 1986.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S.Ct. 2169 (1986).
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger had joined the majority in Roe and Akron but dissented in Thornburgh, writing that "I regretfully conclude that some of the concerns of the
dissenting Justices in Roe, as well as the concerns I expressed in my separate opinion, have
now been realized." Id. at 2190. He called for reexamination of Roe. Justice Byron White,
joined by now-Chief Justice William Rehnquist, has written in dissent that "the time has
come to recognize that Roe v. Wade... 'departs from a proper understanding' of the Constitution and to overrule it." Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2193. As Justice Powell observed in his
majority opinion in Akron, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissent in that case "rejects the
basic premise of Roe and its progeny. [It] stops short of arguing flatly that Roe should be
overruled. Rather, it adopts reasoning that, for all practical purposes, would accomplish
precisely that result." Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 n.1.
Particularly strong or exhaustive substantive dissents from the Court's abortion decisions
include those by Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justice White) in Roe, 410 U.S. at 171; by
Justice White (joined by Justice Rehnquist) in Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221
(1973); by Justice White (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist) in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92 (1976); by Justice White (joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist) in Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 401 (1979); by Justice
O'Connor (joined by Justices White and Rehnquist) in Akron, 462 U.S. at 452; and by Justice
White (joined by Justice Rehnquist) in Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2192.
15. Professor Mark Tushnet writes that "[m]ost academic commentators probably believe that, as a matter of sound public policy, access to abortions should be relatively unrestricted. But none has been able to provide conclusive arguments that the Supreme Court
correctly found that policy in the Constitution." Tushnet, The Supreme Court on Abortion: A
Survey, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 165 (J. Butler & D. Walbert eds.) (3rd ed.
1986).
The academic criticism of Roe and its progeny is so extensive and diverse that the real
task has become organizing it rather than simply keeping a current list. Nevertheless, a representative sample shows the continuing and diverse nature of this critical literature. See,
e.g., ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION:

REVERSING ROE

. WADE THROUGH THE

COURTS 57-114, 123-81 (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunningham eds. 1987); H. ARKES, FIRST
THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE 360-91
(1986); A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14
(1976); S. KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1984); J.

NOONAN, supra note 4, at 5-32; Arkes, Abortion: The Court Wasn't Persuasive, 9 HuM. LIFE
REV. 95 (Spring 1983); Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1973); Csank, The Lords & Givers of Life, 3 HUM. LIFE REV. 75
(Spring 1977); Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U.
PITT. L. REV. 359 (1979); Dellapenna, Nor Piety Nor Wit: The Supreme Courton Abortion, 6
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Uncertainty and confusion within the Supreme Court's abortion
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 379 (1974); Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Needfor
a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975); Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf.A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REv. 159; Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy andEquality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. REv. 375 (1985);
Gorby, The "Right" to an Abortion, the Scope ofFourteenthAmendment "Personhood," and
the Supreme Court's Birth Requirement, 1979 So. ILL. U.L.J. 1; Horan, Forsythe & Grant,
Two Ships Passingin the Nigh" An InterpretivistCritique of the White-Stevens Colloquy on
Roe v. Wade, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 229 (1987); King, The JuridicalStatus of the
Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1653-57
(1979); Krason & Hollberg, The Law andHistory of Abortion: The Supreme Court Refuted,
in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE THE LAW 196-225 (J. Butler & D. Walbert eds.) (3rd ed.
1986); Loewy, Abortive Reasons and Obscene Standards: A Comment on the Abortion and
Obscenity Cases, 52 N.C.L. REv. 223, 223-34 (1973); Noonan, Raw JudicialPower, 8 HUM.
LIFE REv. 71 (Winter 1982); O'Meara, Abortion: The Supreme Court Decides a Non-Case,
1974 SuP. Cr. REV. 337; Rice, The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 HOUSTON
L. REv. 1059 (1973); Rosenblum, Abortion, Personhood,and the FourteenthAmendment, 11
STUDIES IN LAW & MEDICINE 1 (1981); Strong, BicentennialBenchmark Two Centuriesof
Evolution of ConstitutionalProcesses, 55 N.C.L. REv. 1, 96-104 (1976); Vieira, Roe and Doe:
Substantive Due Process and the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1974); Wardle,
Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 1985 B.Y.U.L. REv. 231; Wellington, Common Law Rules and
ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 297-311
(1973); Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-CenturyAbortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 29 (1985); Comment, Roe v. Wade and the Tradi-"
tional Legal Standards Concerning Pregnancy,47 TEMP. L.Q. 715 (1974).
One recent article organized much of the critical literature into no less than twelve different lines of attack. See Horan, Forsythe & Grant, supra, at 230 n.8. Another article reports
that "[tihe Index to Legal Periodicals through May 1984 lists 107 law review articles largely
devoted to substantive criticism of Roe v. Wade. This does not encompass commentary in
books or in articles which cover Roe along with other topics." Horan & Balch, Roe v. Wade:
No Justification in History, Law, or Logic, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE v WADE THROUGH THE COURTS, supra, at 79 n.2.

Even scholars identified as supporters of Roe resort to rewriting the opinion because they,
too, find the actual opinion flawed. See, eg., Heymann & Barzelay, The Forestand the Trees:
Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 784 (1973) ("Sadly, the court failed to
relate the body of long-emerging precedent it recognized as significant.., to those articulable, widely shared principles that the precedents reflect.... This failure leaves the impression that the abortion decisions rest in part on unexplained precedents, in part on an
extremely tenuous relation to provisions of the Bill of Rights, and in part on a raw exercise of
judicial flat."); Perry, Abortion, the PublicMorals, and the Police Power: The EthicalFunction
ofSubstantive Due Process,23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 690 (1976) ("[I]t is difficult to find a case
that raises methodological problems as severe as those left in the wake of Roe."); Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1979) ("The result in the case... was
controversial enough. Beyond that, even people who approve of the result have been dissatisfied
with the Court's opinion. Others before me have attempted to explain how a better
opinion could have been written."); Tribe, Foreward Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973) ("One of the most curious things
about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment on which it
rests is nowhere to be found."); Wheeler & Kovar, Roe v. Wade: The Right to PrivacyRevisited, 21 U. KAN. L. REV. 527, 527 (1973) ("Unfortunately, the decisions themselves fail to
yield a reasonable justification of the constitutional basis for protection of the woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy."). Others "repackage" the opinion. See, eg., Cheremin-
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doctrine stem from several sources. The first is the existence of a
constitutional abortion right itself. Since the days of the common
law and the first American statute in 1821, "[a]bortion regulation
was a matter exclusively for state legislatures." 6 Such state regulation, paralleling the development of medical and general scientific
knowledge of human conception and prenatal development, increasingly restricted abortion, abandoned the inaccurate "quickening"
distinction, and increased penalties for performing abortions. t7 In
the climate of rapid social change occurring throughout the 1960s,
at least one third of the states changed their long-standing abortion
policies in response to public political pressure.' 8 A single Supreme
sky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion Controversy, 31
BUFFALO L. REV. 107, 142 (1982). Significantly, Professor Tribe has recanted his defense of
Roe cited supra. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1349-50 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Wardle has called that article "the most influential article written in defense of the Roe
decision." L. WARDLE, supra note 5, at xii.
16. George, State Legislatures Versus the Supreme Court: Abortion Legislation in the
1980s, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 23 (J. Butler & D. Walbert eds.) (3rd ed.
1986). The first American statute was passed by Connecticut in 1821. See generally Byrn,
supra note 15, at 827-35 (discussing 19th centery abortion statutes in America); Rosenblum,
supra note 15; Quay, JustifiableAbortion-Medicaland Legal Foundations,49 GEO. L.J. 395,
399 (1961) (discussing historical roots of 19th century abortion statutes).
17. Justice Blackmun asserted in Roe that 19th century American statutes banning
abortion, and the quickening distinction they incorporated but eventually abandoned, were
for the purpose of protecting maternal health rather than fetal life. Roe, 410 U.S. at 151-52.
He cited two articles by Cyril Means, legal counsel to the National Association for the Repeal
of Abortion Laws, as evidence of "scholarly support for this view" and offered a single case
citation to show that "[t]he few state courts called upon to interpret their laws.., did focus
on the State's interest in protecting the woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo
or fetus." Id. at 151.
Extensive scholarship has shown Blackmun's conclusions to be false, the product of ignoring much of the evidence and misrepresenting much of the rest. See Byrn, supra note 15,
at 827-35; Dellapenna, Abortion andthe Law: Blackmun's Distortion of the HistoricalRecord,
in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS
137-58 (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunningham eds. 1987); Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 402-04 (1979); Destro, supra
note 15, at 1278-82; Gorby, supra note 15, at 13-21; Horan & Balch, supra note 15, at 67-70;
Horan & Marzen, Abortion and Midwifery: A Footnote in Legal History, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 199-204 (T. Hilgers, D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1981); Krason
& Hollberg, supranote 15, at 207-10; Rosenblum, supra note 15; Witherspoon, supra note 15.
A British scholar writes (in direct reference to Means' work) that "[i]t would be a gross
distortion, however, to believe that all or even most 19th century laws were mainly attempts
to protect women's health. The medical profession was in the forefront of the drive for more
restrictive laws, and . . . the main concern of doctors was with the safety of the foetus.'
Sauer, Attitudes to Abortion in America, 1800-1973, 28 POP. STUD. 53, 57-58 (1974). James
Mohr, author of perhaps the best known historical analysis on abortion in America, notes the
advocacy nature of Means' scholarship and asserts that "Means ... was less than convincing
on several points" and his conclusions "open to serious questions." J. MOHR, ABORTION IN
AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 29-30 (1978).
18. See generally S. KRASON, supra note 15, at 16-39 (a comprehensive survey of public
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Court decision in 1973, however, negated those 150 years of state
regulation and discovered a right to abortion 19 that was deemed to
be "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' "20 itself.2 1 This exand legislative activity leading to reformation of abortion law); Roemer, Legalization ofAbortion in the United States, in THE ABORTION EXPERIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL
IMPACT 284 (H. Osofsky & J. Osofsky eds. 1973); Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictionsand the Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177,
179.
19. See Sobran, Pensees: Notes for the Reactionaryof Tomorrow, NAT'L REV., Dec. 31,
1985, at 54: "The abortion issue had been debated on its substantive merits, but never in
terms of constitutionality... . 'Discovering,' in its way, a 'right of privacy,' which itself is
nowhere explicit in the Constitution, the Court found the 'right' to abortion in the 'penumbra' of this phantom."
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
21. The Supreme Court has used either of two tests to determine which rights are "fundamental" and, therefore, within the liberty protected against unjustified state deprivation by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One test would include those rights
that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" in such a way that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326
(1937). The other, broader, test would include those rights that are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(opinion of Powell, J.). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844, reh'g denied, 107
S.Ct. 29 (1986); Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2194 (White, J., dissenting).
In Roe, Justice Blackmun began the substantive portion of his majority opinion by surveying "the history of abortion, for such insight as that history may afford." Roe, 410 U.S. at
129-47. Commentators have since thoroughly demonstrated that this historical survey was
fundamentally flawed. See supra note 17. They have also observed not only that Justice
Blackmun failed entirely to connect the fruit of this survey with the substantive legal analysis,
but also that this survey is entirely irrelevant to that analysis. See, e.g., Dellapenna, The
History of Abortion, supra note 15, at 424 ("The Court's discussion of history is inaccurate
and inconclusive, and, in any event, unrelated to its later conclusions."); Ely, supra note 15,
at 925 n.42 ("The opinion does contain a lengthy survey of historical attitudes toward abortion.... The Court does not seem entirely clear as to what this discussion has to do with the
legal argument... and the reader is left in much the same quandary. It surely does not seem
to support the Court's position."); Epstein, supranote 15, at 167 ("Before Mr. Justice Blackmun was ready to deal with the constitutional issues, he found it necessary to burden his
opinion with an exhaustive history of abortion from ancient times until the present day. It is
difficult to see what comfort he could draw from his... [NMeither the mass nor the antiquity
of the sources can conceal their essential irrelevancy to the constitutional inquiry."); Note,
Roe and Doe: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1181 n.1l0 (1974)
("The exercise is most remarkable for its failure to relate the discussion to the Court's analysis.").
Such a survey could have even potential relevance only to the Court's assertion that abortion is a fundamental right. The only approach to answering this question to which an historical review could contribute is the broader "Nation's history and tradition" approach. Some
commentators have suggested that this was Blackmun's unstated intention. See, eg., Tribe,
supra note 15, at 3 n.13 ("The Court's recitation of the history seems to be designed largely to
support its view that 'at the time of the adoption of our Constitution... a woman enjoyed a
substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today.' But
the bearing of that proposition on the constitutional issue is unclear") (citation omitted);
Note, supra, at 1181 ("IT]he Court's labored historical sketch of attitudes toward abortion
may have been an attempt to bring that case within the tradition analysis."). However, not
only was Justice Blackmun's survey seriously flawed and his connection of that survey to the
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tra-constitutional right would form the basis for the continuing revision of state abortion regulation.
In addition to the existence of the right, the source of the right
has been an area of confusion. In Roe, the Supreme Court itself was
unsure whether the right emanated penumbrally from the corpus of
the Bill of Rights or derived from either the ninth or the fourteenth
amendment.2 2 Although the abortion right is within the general
constitutional "right to privacy, '2 3 it is inherently different from the
Court's previous privacy cases.2 4 One lower court trying to sort out
the Supreme Court's abortion doctrine, stated: "The fact that both
procreation and abortion have been held to be fundamental rights is

understandably confusing.

25

A further source of confusion, arising from the trimester system
created by the Court in Roe, concerns the issue of when other interests can be recognized so as to limit the abortion right. Roe established the end of both the first and second trimesters of pregnancy
as points when the state's interests in protecting maternal health
and fetal life, respectively, become compelling.26 Lower federal
courts have used these guidelines as bright lines that initially
seemed helpful in assessing constitutional challenges to abortion
statues.2 7 Since Roe, however, the abortionist decides when the
legal issues entirely absent, but he explicitly based his finding of fundamentality on the "ordered liberty" test rather than this "history and tradition" test, the only one to which his
survey could have had even the most tenuous connection! Nothing but a six-word quote from
Palko provided the label for Justice Blackmun's actual assertion that the right to choose
between alternative methods of ending a pregnancy is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" itself.
22. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
23. Id. at 153.
24. Id. at 159. As Justice White has observed:
However one answers the metaphysical or theological question whether the fetus is a "human being" or the legal question whether it is a "person," as that term is
used in the Constitution, one must at least recognize, first, that the fetus is an entity
that bears in its cells all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the
species homo sapiens and distinguishes an individual member of that species from
all others, and second, that there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a
child or, indeed, an adult human being. Given that the continued existence and
development-that is to say, the life-of such an entity are so directly at stake in
the woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, that decision
must be recognized as sui generis, different in kind from the others that the Court
has protected under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy.
Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2195 (White, J., dissenting). See also Ely, supra note 15, at 925,
927.
25. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Gerstein v. Coe,
428 U.S. 901 (1976).
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160, 163.
27. See, e.g., Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894,
899 (N.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services v. Orr, 451
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state's compelling interest in fetal life exists because he alone may
determine whether a preborn child is viable.2 8 The state's interest
in maternal health has been limited by the Court which, while
claiming to affirm Roe, has shifted this line somewhere into the second trimester so as to conform to the "accepted medical practices"
of abortion practitioners themselves.2 9 Thus, the already minimal
recognition given to state interests by Roe has been eroded by subsequent decisions, further demonstrating the slippery nature of the
Court's abortion doctrine and the confusion of state legislatures as
to the actual contours of legitimate regulation.
A fourth source of confusion is the question of whose right Roe
established and subsequent cases supposedly vindicated. This question is of crucial importance in establishing the breadth of the
Court's abortion doctrine and, more particularly, in properly assessing informed consent statutes. Roe spoke of "the abortion decision,"30 "a woman's decision,"3 1 and "reasons for which a
physician and his pregnant patient might decide that she should
have an abortion." 32 It also stated that "the attending physician, in
consultation with his patient, is free to determine ... that, in his
medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated" 3 3
and that "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the ... attending physician."34 Each of
U.S. 934 (1981); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick 401 F. Supp. 554, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
28. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1979).
29. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983).
The Court emphasized that regulations furthering the state's interest in maternal health must
not "depart from accepted medical practice." Id. at 431. Such standards are regularly derived from the statements or positions of the American Public Health Association and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). Id. at 435-37. Both organizations have unbroken records of advocacy for virtually unlimited legal access to abortion.
ACOG, of course, brought the successful constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania's abortion
control statute in Thornburgh.
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 155.
31. Id. at 153.
32. Id. at 156.
33. Id. at 163.
34. Id. at 164. Dr. Alan Stone, Professor of Law and Professor of Psychiatry at
Harvard University, finds this particular statement by Justice Blackmun very revealing. He
writes: "Although we have come to know the abortion decision as freedom of choice versus
right to life, we find Justice Blackmun writing not that the state must yield to the woman's
choice but to the 'physician's medical judgement.'" Stone, supra note 5, at 579. Other writers have also acknowledged the substantive ambiguity of the Supreme Court's abortion doctrine on this particular question. Dr. Stone repeatedly refers to this reference to medical
judgment as "misleading." Id. at 580, 581. It also is a criticism urged by some feminist
writers. See, eg., R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMEN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 125-26, 289-93 (1984).
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these formulations suggests a different location of the right. Roe
spoke of "the right of the physician to administer medical treatment
according to his medical judgment, ' 35 and Roe's companion case
spoke of "the physician's right to administer" medical care and "the
physician's right to practice."' 36 These suggestions of an independent physician's right have become central themes in the Court's
analysis of informed consent statutes but, upon examination as in
this article, are fundamentally flawed.
The question of whose right is implicated when states seek to
regulate abortion is crucial to a proper analysis of a statute's consti-

tutionality. While, upon first examination, the Supreme Court's
abortion cases may not seem very confusing on this point, actual

results and important dicta in some recent decisions strongly suggest that the Court actually bases its decisions on a different answer
to this question. That is, although the Court states that the abortion right is the woman's right of choice, it invalidates certain kinds
of abortion regulations, like informed consent statutes, on the basis
of their impact on the physician and his freedom to practice
medicine." 7 The Court's failure to properly and consistently address this issue has led to flawed and confusing analysis and, therefore, to improper results. It has produced an inherently nebulous
abortion doctrine, lacking manageable and articulable boundaries,
and has allowed the Court to achieve whatever results it wants in
individual cases and to thwart legitimate state efforts to both improve the woman's decision-making process and to protect preborn
human life.
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
36. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197, 199 (1973).
37. The Court has invalidated informed consent requirements for two "equally decisive"
reasons. The first is the Court's conclusion that "much of the information required is
designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether." Akron, 462 U.S. at 444. The Court has gone so far as to suggest that it deems the
woman's choice already informed, her decision already made, at the time she consults with
the physician whom the statute requires to convey certain information, stating that "Danforth's recognition of the State's interest in ensuring that this information be given will not
justify abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth." Id. at 443-44 (emphasis added). The second reason for invalidation is
that these requirements intrude upon the discretion of the physician, thereby placing him in
an "'undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket.'" Id. at 445 (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)). See also Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2179.
This Article analyzes both these reasons. First, it examines the notion that physicians
have some kind of right to be free from government regulation in their practice of medicine.
It then looks at the nature of the abortion right, the nature of abortion, and the context in
which the abortion right is sought to be exercised, in order to assess the claim that informed
consent requirements are undue burdens on the woman's right of choice.
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Another source of confusion contributing to this malleability of
doctrine stems from the Court's failure to delineate and consistently
apply the precise nature of the abortion right itself. Is it a right to
terminate pregnancy 38 or a right to kill the fetus? 39 Is it an abstract
right to an abortion or the freedom to choose between abortion and
childbirth?" Is it a right to control one's own body4 1 or the right to
make certain kinds of decisions?4 2
In addition to the issue of whose right is implicated in the abortion context, a clear explanation of the nature of the abortion right
is necessary to a properly confined, consistent analysis of state abortion regulations. Such an explanation is especially important because, as the Court has repeatedly declared, important interests
other than the woman's are at stake. If, for example, the right is to
an abortion itself, then state requirements for conveying information which could potentially make abortion a less desirable option
would be suspect. If, however, the right is one of choice between
38. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
39. A three-judge federal court has held that there is no "constitutionally protected
right to kill the fetus." Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has never confronted this precise question. However, the Court invalidated measures prescribing a standard of care by the physician toward the fetus in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 81-84 (1976), Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979), and in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986), but upheld a
requirement that a second physician be present when abortions are performed after viability
in Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482-86 (1983). As such, the Supreme
Court's view on this issue is at least ambiguous.
40. The Supreme Court has held that the right to choose not to have an abortion is "at
least as fundamental" as the right to choose to have one. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472
n.7 (1977). At the same time, the Court has seemingly protected the right to choose the
abortion option more than specifically enumerated individual rights like freedom of speech.
See Ely, supra note 15, at 953. The Court's strong language in Thornburgh is the closest it
has yet come to holding that anything even potentially tending to deemphasize the attractiveness of the one option, abortion, is presumptively unconstitutional.
41. Although the Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument in Roe, 410 U.S. at
154, the popular media and abortion proponents (even some law school professors) continue
to discuss the abortion right in these terms.
On this point, juvenile court Judge Randall J. Hekman has written:
Two basic points need to be made in responding to this argument. First, no
one-man or woman-has the unqualified right to the control over his or her own
body. For example, a person may legally be punished for taking or using an illicit
or nonprescribed drug with his or her body. A person who unsuccessfully attempts
suicide can be punished. A woman is not legally free to sell her sexual services even
to a consenting adult man.
Second, medical facts show that abortion involves the deliberate taking of another person's life.
R. HEKMAN, JUSTICE FOR THE UNBORN 49-50 (1984).
42. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
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abortion or childbirth, then the presentation of information germane to that decision rather than the likely side of the decisional
scale on which that information may appear for most women is
more important.
These doctrinal and analytical problems are particularly acute
concerning the Supreme Court's analysis of informed consent to
abortion statutes. The issue of the role of the physician constitutes
one of the most ambiguous features of the abortion doctrine. When
confronting statutes implicating this role, most notably informed
consent statutes, the Supreme Court has consistently failed to analyze the issues raised with reference to the nature of the right purportedly established in Roe or to traditional jurisprudence
concerning public control of the medical profession. Rather, the
Court has used vague references to the "rights" of physicians and
has failed to specify either the source and nature of these rights or,
more importantly, how the statute involving the physician under
consideration violates or burdens the woman's right of choice. One
commentator has observed that "no consistent policy toward informed consent in the abortion context has emerged."4 3 Instead,
the Court has suggested that informed consent statutes violate the
woman's right to abortion by affecting the discretion of her physician.' In addition to ignoring the nature of the abortion right and
43. Note, Abortion Regulation: The Circumscriptionof State Intervention by the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 15 GA. L. REV. 681, 685 (1981).
Commentators examining informed consent and the physician's role in the abortion context also have failed to examine either the nature of the abortion right or the state's traditional power to regulate the medical profession, both of which bear directly on the
constitutional room that must be given to physician's discretion. See, e.g., Marcin & Marcin,
The Physician'sDecision-MakingRole in Abortion Cases, 35 JURIST 66 (1975); Wood & Durham, Counseling, Consulting, and Consent: Abortion and the Doctor-PatientRelationship,
1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 783; Note, Abortion Regulation: The Circumscriptionof State Intervention by the Doctrine of Informed Consent, supra; Note, The Abortion Alternative and the Patient's Right to Know, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 167.
44. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Supreme Court laid the
foundation for subsequent invalidation of statutes which burden a woman's rights by interfering with her physician's discretion. The Court defined informed consent as "the giving of
information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences." Id. at
67 n.8. It added the dictum that "[tjo ascribe more meaning than this might well confine the
attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession." Id. The Court has never explained why the desire and comfort of the physician is
the touchstone for assessing the constitutionality of these statutes.
Courts picked up on this theme and have invalidated informed consent statutes because
they constituted such a "straitjacket." See, e.g., Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2179; Akron, 462
U.S. at 445; Charles v. Daly, 749 F.2d 452, 461 (7th Cir. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986).
Other commentators see this theme as stemming directly from Roe itself. See, e.g., Stone,
supra note 5, at 579-82.
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the state's traditional power to regulate the medical profession, this
method of analysis prevents the state from properly asserting its interest in protecting the woman's exercise of her fundamental right
by ensuring that her choice of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy by abortion is truly informed. This interest is especially great
in the abortion context where the reasons for undergoing the medical procedure,
and many of its consequences, are not medical at
45
all.
Rather, the Court has taken increasingly extreme and logically
incoherent positions. By 1986, simply informing women that certain written factual information was available if they chose to view it
was an unconstitutional "wedge . . . into the privacy of the in46
formed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician.
At the same time, the Court has ruled that the state may not ensure
that such a dialogue exists by requiring any physician to actually
convey information to women contemplating abortion.4 7 The Court
has held that the state may not require that information about agencies available to assist a woman should she choose the childbirth
option be given to any women because it might not be relevant to all
women.4" Astonishingly, the Court has even held that requiring
physicians to tell women contemplating abortion about the detrimental effects of abortion or the particular medical risks of the
abortion procedure she would undergo "is the antithesisof informed
consent."4 9 These bizarre results are products of a fundamentally
flawed method of analysis and were cited by former Chief Justice
Burger as prompting his departure from the majority ranks and his
belief that Roe itself should be reexamined. 0
The Court's treatment of informed consent provisions is incon45. One commentator put it this way: "Admittedly abortion is a medical procedure.
But the question remains why the Court in Roe insisted that it was a medical decision."
Moore, Moral Sentiment in Judicial Opinions on Abortion, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 591, 626
(1975) (emphasis in original). Abortion is as much a medical matter as capital punishment is
an electrical engineering matter. Implementation requires the knowledge and technical skill
of third-party professionals, but the decision itself is another matter altogether.
46. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2179.
47. Id. at 2180; Akron, 462 U.S. at 447. The Court bases this contention on its conjecture that a physician taking the time (the Court never says how much) to furnish the limited
information required by informed consent statutes may (the Court never shows that it will)
increase the cost of an abortion (the Court never says by how much). The Court never explains how a minimal increase in cost is a constitutionally undue burden on a woman's right
to choose between abortion and childbirth such that it alone overcomes the important state
interest in ensuring that the decision is informed.
48. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2179-80.
49. Id. at 2180 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 2190-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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sistent with its other holdings within the abortion context and to
jurisprudence on informed consent to medical treatment outside
that context. In short, because its analysis is flawed, the Court's
decisions concerning informed consent to abortion have produced
improper results, overly hostile to important interests and even to
the right of choice that Roe itself established. In this area, the
Court's decisions have been inconsistent with three other areas of
jurisprudence: public control of the medical profession generally,
informed consent to medical treatment outside the abortion context,
and other aspects of the abortion doctrine itself. These inconsistencies have produced a scheme of ad hoc activist judgments by the
Court which have been overly hostile to important interests implicated when the abortion decision is made.51 A new framework,
presented herein, is possible once these inconsistencies are
highlighted.
Assuming, for present purposes, that Roe "seems like a durable
decision,"5 2 this Article will attempt to put the role of the physician
with respect to informed consent in better perspective. After briefly
reviewing the Court's decisions in this area, it will examine the two
reasons given by the Court for invalidating informed consent provisions. First, this section will address the Court's point about interference with physician discretion by noting federal court
jurisprudence regarding public regulation of the medical profession
in the non-abortion context. Next, it will address the Court's second point about interference with the woman's right by delineating
the nature of the abortion right and realistically appraising both the
nature of abortion and the context in which the abortion right is
51. In Roe, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the state has increasingly important
interests in both maternal health and fetal life. At some point in pregnancy, these interests
become compelling. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. The source and weight of the state's interest in
the integrity of a woman's abortion decision is unclear, though it stems at least in part from
the state's interest in maternal health generally. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443 (1983). This consideration cannot be the sole source of the interest, however, because the Court has held that a state may not regulate abortion in the interest
of maternal health during the first trimester. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. The court has, at the
same time, upheld a state requirement that physicians obtain written informed consent before
performing abortions during the first trimester. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 66-67 (1976). The Court so held in Danforth because "it is desirable and imperative that
[the decision whether or not to abort] be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences." Id. at 67. Therefore, the state interest in the integrity of the abortion decision is
separate, at least in part, from the acknowledged state interest in maternal health that becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester or the state interest in fetal life that becomes
compelling at the end of the second trimester. This result is not so much a product of the
rules the Court laid down in Roe as of its ad hoc judgment in Danforth.
52. Ely, supra note 15, at 947.
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sought to be exercised. In conclusion, it will present a more consistent framework for evaluating the constitutionality of informed consent to abortion statutes.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S INFORMED CONSENT DECISIONS:
A REVIEW AND PRELIMINARY CRITIQUE

The Supreme Court held in Roe that the constitutional right of
privacy encompasses "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 5 3 This prerogative is a constitutionally protected interest "in making certain kinds of important decisions" free
from unjustified government interference. 4 "A woman has at least
an equal right to choose to carry her fetus to term as to choose to
55
abort it."
In Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth,5 6 the Court upheld a Missouri statutory provision requiring that women certify their consent
to an abortion in writing and that such consent be "informed and
freely given and not the result of coercion."5 7 The district court
had upheld that provision, stressing that such a requirement gave
the woman control over her physician's discretion and ensured that
the person constitutionally empowered to make the abortion decision was, in fact, the one who truly made it.58 The Supreme Court,
upholding the provision despite its application in the first trimester
of pregnancy and its application to abortion but not to other surgical procedures, emphasized that "it is desirable and imperative that
[the decision] be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences."5 9 The Court accepted the definition of "informed" as
"the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be
done and as to its consequences" 6 but cautioned that "[t]o ascribe
more meaning than this might well confine the attending physician
in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his
profession."'"
The same year it decided Danforth, the Court summarily affirmed a three-judge district court decision upholding a Pennsylvania informed consent provision. In Planned Parenthood v.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977).
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 67 n.8.
Id.
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Fitzpatrick,6 2 the court applied "the rational relationship test"6 3
rather than strict judicial scrutiny because it found that the information the statute required to be given did not "chill the exercise of
the abortion option."'
Requiring that this information be conveyed, the court noted, "is suggested ... by the realities of the system that provides abortions."6 5 The physician remains free to add
anything he chooses to make the standardized information required
66
by the statute more relevant to a particular patient's situation.
The statute required that each woman be advised: "(i) that there
may be detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not
foreseeable, (ii) of possible alternatives to abortion, including childbirth and adoption, and (iii) of the medical procedures to be
,

used."

67

The Court next reviewed an informed consent provision in 1983.
The ordinance at issue in Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive
Health 68 required the attending physician to present a woman contemplating abortion with several categories of information including
the status of her pregnancy, the development of the fetus, the date
of possible viability, the physical and emotional consequences of
abortion, and the availability of agencies providing assistance and
information on birth control, adoption, and childbirth. It required
the physician to tell the woman of the particular risks associated
with both her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed.6 9 Consistent with the court's observation in Fitzpatrick, the
ordinance in Akron explicitly allowed the physician to make
standarized information more relevant to an individual patient by
imparting "other information which in his own medical judgment is
relevant to her decision." 7 °
The Court invalidated every part of the informed consent provision in Akron. The court in Fitzpatrick had first determined the
general nature of the burden that the informed consent provision
under review placed on the woman's decision whether or not to
abort. Finding first that it would not "chill the exercise of the abor62. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem. sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428
U.S. 901 (1976).
63. Id. at 587.
64. Id.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 587-88.
Id. at 583.
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
Id. at 442.

70. Id.
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tion option," the court then determined that strict judicial scrutiny
was not appropriate and upheld the provision under the rational
relationship test.7" The Court in Akron, however, made no such
analysis to determine the appropriate standard of review but appeared to apply strict scrutiny immediately.
The Court struck down the informed consent provision for two
"equally decisive"7" reasons. The first was based on its conjecture
that "it is fair to say that much of the information required is
designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade
her to withhold it altogether."7 3 Several problems with this apparent constitutional rule are immediately apparent. First, the Court
had previously held that the state may legitimately pursue a policy
preference of favoring childbirth over abortion to the extent of refusing to pay for abortions women could not otherwise afford.74 In
his opinion for the Court in H.L. v. Matheson,7 5 Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[t]he Constitution does not compel a state to finetune its statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions" and held
that encouraging childbirth over abortion was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.7 6 Second, to invalidate an informed consent requirement because it may make some women less likely to
choose the option of abortion violates the basic notion that Roe established a right to choose between options, not a right to choose
only one. Third, the Court's holding in Akron begs a fundamental
question: if such information is likely to have some persuasive force
(in whatever direction), does this fact not argue even more for its
introduction into the decision making process? Fourth, the Court
professed to base its inclusion of the abortion decision within the
right to privacy in Roe on a list of possible "detriments" that foreclosing the abortion option might impose on some women.7 7 Why,
71. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. at 587.
72. Akron, 462 U.S. at 445.
73. Id. at 444.
74. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
75. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
76. Id. at 413.
77. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court stated:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying
this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable
even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also
the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
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then, is it constitutionally impermissible to require the presentation
of demonstrably accurate factual information about possible complications of abortion? Is it simply because the Court labels it a
"parade of horribles"?7 8 Can it be that only the Court is constitutionally entitled to use its imagination?
The Court's second basis for invalidating the Akron informed
consent ordinance was "its intrusion upon the discretion of the
pregnant woman's physician." 7 9 Although the Akron ordinance explicitly recognized that a physician is free to use standardized information from a perspective that is relevent to an individual case, the
Court stated that a requirement to present such information places
" 'obstacles in the path of the doctor.' ,8o The Court failed to explain what these constitutionally significant obstacles were or, more
importantly, how they burdened or interfered with the woman's
right of choice. The issue of whether requiring a physician to present information burdens that physician affects neither the woman's
need for information nor the relevence of such information to her.
By 1983, the Court had yet to establish its apparent view that physicians have some right to practice abortion (they have no such right
outside the abortion context) entirely free from regulation by the
state.
The Court approved the substance of one category of information required by the Akron ordinance: "the particular risks associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be
employed."'8 However, the Court struck down even this provision
because it required the attending physician, and no one else, to present this information. 8z Thus, even though Roe and subsequent
cases had emphasized the central role of the physician in both the
making and the implementing of the woman's decision,8 3 the state
may not require that the physician perform this role. Ironically, the
Court struck the requirement for the presentation of more general
information about abortion complications because it intruded upon
the physician's particular medical judgment regarding his individual patient, and yet invalidated the more individualized information
about particular risks of the procedure to be employed in each case
78. Akron, 462 U.S. at 445.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977)).
81. Id. at 446.
82. Id. at 447.
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 164. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979)
(stressing the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the woman about whether
to have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion is to be carried out).
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on the theory that the physician should not be required to speak at
all.
Three years later, the Court again struck down a variety of informed consent provisions. The Pennsylvania statute at issue in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists84 required the physician to provide five kinds of medical
information:
(a) the name of the physician who will perform the abortion,
(b) the "fact that there may be detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable," (c) the "particular medical risks associated with the particular abortion
procedure to be employed," (d) the probable gestational age, and
(e) the8 5 "medical risks associated with carrying her child to
term."
The statute also required that the woman be told that medical
assistance might be available if she chose to continue her pregnancy
and that the father of the child was liable to assist in the child's
support.8 6 Finally, the woman must be informed that printed material is available, should she choose to view it, describing the facts of
prenatal development and listing agencies offering alternatives to
87
abortion.
The Court struck down this entire scheme because not all of it is
always relevant to every woman's individual decision 8 or some of it
may be "out of step with the needs of the particular woman."89
Such a scheme officially structures the dialogue between woman
and physician, the Court said, and is only a means of "discouragement of the abortion decision." 9 0 Some of it is nonmedical information "beyond the physician's area of expertise." 9 1
While the Court in Akron had approved in substance the requiring of information as to "the particular medical risks associated
with [the woman's] own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be
employed," 9' the Court in Thornburgh struck down the requiring of
information as to "particular medical risks."93 In Danforth, the
Court had said "it is... imperative that [the decision] be made with
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

106 S.Ct. 2169 (1986).
Id. at 2178.
Id. at 2179.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2180.
Id.
Id.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 446.
Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2180.
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full knowledge of its nature and consequences." 94 For the Court in
1976, "the giving of information as to just what would be done and
as to its consequences" was the very definition of informed consent.95 For the Court in 1986, the giving of information as to the
abortion technique to be used and the complications and risks of
abortion and childbirth was the very "antithesis of informed consent.",96 The Court in Fitzpatrickhad approved the requiring of information on the "detrimental physical and psychological effects of
abortion." 97 The Court in Thornburgh struck down the requiring of
information on "detrimental physical and psychological effects of
abortion."9 8
Thus, the Court in Akron and Thornburgh assumed that informed consent provisions necessarily and unduly burden a woman's right of choice and unconstitutionally infringe on the
physician's judgment and practice of the physician's profession.
Further, the Court now holds that the physician need not even be
involved at all in the actual counseling with women contemplating
abortion. This Article will proceed to address the question of physicians' rights by examining the law with respect to regulation of the
medical profession. It will address the question of whether statutes
requiring that minimal information be given to ensure informed
consent burden the abortion right by examining that right, the context in which it is sought to be asserted, and the nature of abortion
itself.

III.

ANALYZING THE COURT'S REASONS:

INTERFERENCE

WITH PHYSICIAN DISCRETION

The Supreme Court, in its abortion decisions, has always placed
heavy emphasis on the importance of the physician's role in the
abortion context.9 9 Indeed, the Court believes that abortion is in-

herently a medical procedure." This heavy emphasis, combined
with the Court's invalidation of informed consent statutes because
94. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
95. Id. at 67 n.8.
96. Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2180 (emphasis added).
97. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. at 583.
98. Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2180.
99. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. at 427, 429-30, 445; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
387, 394, 396 (1979); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163,
165-66; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92, 197 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick,
410 F. Supp. 554, 564, 569 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S.
901 (1976).
100. See Colautti,439 U.S. at 387; Doe, 410 U.S. at 215.
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of their interference with the physician's discretion, 10 1 suggests that
the Court, at least implicitly, recognizes an independent right of the
physician to practice medicine, at least in the abortion context, free
from such interference. The Court has occasionally made reference,

in its abortion decisions, to the "rights" of physicians.1 °z Inasmuch
as the Court has never explicitly held that such a right exists in the
abortion context,10 3 it is helpful to examine federal court jurisprudence outside the abortion context to determine whether such a

physician's right with constitutional significance
recognized.
A.

has been

A Right to PracticeMedicine?

Attempts to assert an independent right to practice medicine
have typically been made in the context of attacks on state regulations claimed to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The right to practice, it is claimed, is part of the "liberty" or "property" protected by that clause against unjustified infringement by the state.
Such an argument was rejected in some of the early cases in
which courts recognized broad latitude for the state's police power
to operate in this area. For example, the Supreme Court rejected a
fourteenth amendment due process claim of a property right in the
practice of medicine in McNaughton v. Johnson,"° stating: "It is
established that a State may regulate the practice of medicine, using
101. See supra note 44.
102. See, eg., Doe, 410 U.S. at 197, 199. See also Stone, supra note 5, at 579: "we find
Justice Blackmun writing not that the state must yield to the woman's choice but to the
physician's 'medical judgement.'"
103. In Doe, the Court suggested in dicta that such a right existed. 410 U.S. at 197-98,
199. This suggestion was taken seriously by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court who stated in a dissent that Doe "speaks specifically of the doctor's right to administer
medical care." People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 723, 591 P.2d 919, 935, 153 Cal. Rptr.
431, 447 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). However, the U.S. Supreme
Court specifically rejected this notion that such cited passages from Doe establish a "right to
practice medicine free from unwarranted state inference." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604
n.33 (1977). Rather, the Court said that the doctor's right is derived entirely from the patient's. The regulation in Doe was invalidated because it encumbered her right by "placing
obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom she was entitled to rely for advice in connection with her decision. If those obstacles had not impacted upon the woman's freedom to
make a constitutionally protected decision, if they had merely made the physician's work
more laborious or less independent without any impact on the patient, they would not have
violated the Constitution." Id. The Court has never explained the contradiction between this
holding and its subsequent elevation of physician discretion to constitutional significance,
separate from and even equal to the female patients' right of choice. See supra notes 72-73,
79-80 and accompanying text.
104. 242 U.S. 344 (1917).
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this word in its most general sense." 10 5
This due process argument, however, eventually prevailed during the early part of this century, when the philosophy of substantive due process dominated the Court's approach to reviewing state
economic regulations. In Lochner v. New York,10 6 the Court said
that if the regulation on bakers' hours at issue in that case was upheld, similar regulation of "doctors, lawyers, scientists, all profes107 The court in Baker v. Daly10 8
sional men" would soon follow.
sustained a challenge to the state's Cosmetic Therapy Law on similar grounds, stating that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment included the right to earn a living and to live and work
where and how one wished. 109 Likewise, in Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,11 ° the Supreme Court invalidated a state law requiring that
pharmacies be owned by pharmacists. While acknowledging that
the state "undoubtedly may regulate the prescription, compounding
of prescriptions, purchase and sale of medicines, by appropriate legislation to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the public
health,"1'11 the Court held that the mere ownership of a drug store
bore no rational relationship to public health. Thus, the court concluded that the regulation infringed upon the appellant's property
11 2
rights in the business of pharmacy.
The demise of substantive due process brought an end to the
recognition of a constitutionally significant liberty or property right
to practice medicine. The Supreme Court overruled Liggett in
1973, the same year it decided Roe, and noted that the substantive
due process philosophy had been rejected and replaced by the principle that "states have power to legislate against what are found to
be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal
'
constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law." 113
The Court rejected a due process claim in Semler v. Oregon
State Board of Dental Examiners114 and described the special defer105. Id. at 348-49.
106. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
107. Id. at 60.
108. 15 F.2d 881 (D. Or. 1926).
109. Id. at 882.
110. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
111. Id. at 112.
112. Id. at 111, 116.
113. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156, 165
(1973) (quoting Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949)).
114. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
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ence with which it would treat state regulation of the medical
profession: "The legislature was not dealing with traders in commodities, but with the vital interest of public health, and with a
profession treating bodily ills." '11 In Johnston v. Board of Dental
Examiners,16 the court upheld the Dental Act of 1940 and regulations promulgated under it, despite the appellant's claim that "unduly oppressive and unwarranted restrictions [had] been placed
upon the conduct of his profession."" 7 In so doing, the court
stated: "The courts have so often sustained identical legislative provisions that we are somewhat surprised at appellant's apparently
serious re-presentation of this argument here." '
In summary, then, the federal courts no longer recognize an independent constitutionally significant "right to practice medicine"
free from government interference. 19 The Supreme Court provides
no justification for apparently resurrecting this notion within the
abortion context while maintaining its burial outside that context.
The constitutional significance of the physician's desires and comfort 2 ' is simply stated as fact, rather than established. This notion
is not only unsupported, but it has been affirmatively rejected elsewhere. As such, the Court's reliance on this notion is fundamentally flawed. To the extent that reliance on this notion is outcomedeterminative, the Court's results are wrong as well. Moreover, the
explicit elevation of interference with physicians' discretion to a criterion equally decisive with burdening the woman's right of choice
for invalidating informed consent requirements1 21 shows that this
flawed premise has indeed become outcome-determinative.
B. State Regulation of the Medical Profession
It would be erroneous to suggest that, because there exists no
independent constitutional "right to practice medicine," any form
of regulation by the state is permissible. Such regulation must still
115. Id. at 612.
116. 134 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
117. Id. at 10.
118. Id. at 11.
119. See 70 CJ.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 6 (1987); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, Etc. § 13 (1987).
120. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the Court approved the general requirement of
obtaining written informed consent but cautioned that the state could not define "informed"
in a way that placed the physician in "an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the
practice of his profession." Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8.
121. See Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2179; Akron, 462 U.S. at 445.
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conform to the dictates of the Constitution. 122 In addition, permissible state regulation of the medical profession may in part be determined by the effect it has on the patient/consumer of medical care.
It is important, however, to note that the practice of medicine falls
squarely within the ambit of the state police power, perhaps more
directly than any other profession.
1. Basis for state regulation
State regulation of the medical profession is grounded in the police power. As the Supreme Court stated nearly 100 years ago:
"The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its
people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of
ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud." 12' 3
Likewise, in Watson v. State of Maryland,'2 4 the Court declared a
recognized principle:
It is too well settled to require discussion at this day that the
police power of the State extends to the regulation of certain
trades and callings, particularly those which closely concern the
public health. There is perhaps no profession more properly
open to such regulation
than that which embraces the practition25
ers of medicine.1
The "right to practice medicine," then, if it exists at all, is a conditional one, subject to the states' police power to safeguard the public
26
health.

1

2. Permissibleforms of state regulation
The police power of the state has justified several forms of permissible regulation of the medical profession. The most significant
element of such regulation, for present purposes, is the degree to
which such regulation touches the core of the physician's practice:
his discretion and medical judgment in dealing with patients. The
122. The fact that constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court can have such a preemptory effect on policymaking by state legislatures in areas traditionally left solely to their
discretion only heightens the need for careful, clear, consistent interpretation and application
of constitutional provisions and cautions against creating new "rights" not clearly found in
the text or history of the Constitution. It also cautions against ad hoc formulations to achieve
desired results.
123. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
124. 218 U.S. 173 (1910).
125. Id. at 176.
126. See Geiger v. Jenkins, 316 F. Supp. 370, 373 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (three-judge court).
See also McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (1917); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons

§§ 6-8 (1987); 61 AM. JUR. 2D, Physicians,Surgeons, Etc. §§ 131, 132, 134 (1987).
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permissible forms of state regulation reviewed here increasingly approach that core; the law of informed consent to medical treatment
affects it directly.
a. Initiallicensing. Perhaps the most clearly recognized means
of state provision for the general welfare and of safeguarding the
public health through regulating the medical profession is requiring
physicians and surgeons to obtain licenses or certificates before
practicing and determining the qualifications for such licensure. As
long as such requirements for licensure are related to the profession
and are reasonably attainable, they are consistent with the police
power and have repeatedly been upheld.127 Through licensure, the
state may define the practice of medicine and ensure the competence of those who follow that calling. 2 8 As will become apparent
in the course of this discussion, however, simply because an individual meets the state's initial requirement for licensure does not mean
he is free to practice entirely at his own unfettered discretion.
b. Supervision and revocation. Determination of qualifications
for practice and the requirement of a license constitute only the bare
minimum of permissible state regulation of the medical profession.' 2 9 Related to the power to determine qualifications for initial
licensing is the state's power to supervise the profession and to suspend or revoke the licenses of those failing to maintain the requisite
qualifications.
An important case relating to the subject of this Article is Missouri ex. rel. Hurwitz v. North, 3 0 in which the Supreme Court upheld, on equal protection grounds, a statute vesting the state board
of health with authority to revoke a physician's license for unlaw127. See Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Reetz v.
Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Geiger v. Jenkins, 316 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (three-judge court).
128. See Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 296 (1912). See also Hawker v. New York, 170
U.S. 189, 191 (1898); 70 C.J.S. Physiciansand Surgeons §§ 11-13 (1981).
129. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Supreme Court invalidated a state requirement that two doctors concur with the determination of a woman's physician that an
abortion was necessary. In so doing, the Court stated: "If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license are available remedies." Id. at 199. In light of both the
principles governing state regulation of the medical profession and the Court's later abortion
cases, however, this cannot be seen as the infirmity requiring invalidation. Rather, invalidation of this provision was proper because it vested an absolute veto of an adult woman's
fundamental right to decide whether or not to have an abortion in third parties. See Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976);
cf.H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
130. 271 U.S. 40 (1926).
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fully procuring an abortion. 13 1 Such a statute would be invalidated
today under Roe because of its direct impact on the availability of
abortion. However, the physician's right in the abortion context
can appropriately be viewed only as derivative from the woman's
1 32
right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Clearly, barring from practice those who would violate prohibitions
on the performance of abortions would make effectuating the woman's abortion decision impossible and it is for this reason that the
North statute would be struck down today. As such, that case's
basic principle still retains its vitality:
A statute which places all physicians in a single class, and
prescribes a uniform standard of professional attainment and
conduct, as a condition of the practice of their profession, and a
reasonable procedure applicable to them as a class to insure conformity to that standard, does not deny equal protection 133
of the
laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The courts have long upheld statutes authorizing boards to determine what constitutes unprofessional conduct or to establish
other criteria for the revocation of licenses to practice medicine.' 34
In Barsky v. Board of Regents,1 35 the Court said:
It is elemental that a state has broad powers to establish and
enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the
health of everyone there. It is a vital part of a state's police
power. The state's discretion in that field extends naturally
to
1 36
the regulation of all professions concerned with health.
c. Commercial aspects of practice. In Johnston v. Board of
Dental Examiners, 37 despite the appellant's claim that "unduly op131. Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld an action by a state
licensing committee revoking a physician's license for "misconduct" involving the performance of an abortion. Ladrey v. Commission on Licensure to Practice, 261 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir.
1958). The court noted that it was not even argued "that practitioners of medicine may not
be regulated." Id. at 70. As in Missouri ex rel Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926), this
decision could not be made today, but only because of its impact on a woman's right to
choose whether or not to have an abortion, not because physicians have an independent constitutional right to practice medicine.
132. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977).
133. 271 U.S. at 43.
134. See, e.g., Johnston v. Board of Dental Examiners, 134 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Ritholz v. Indiana Bd. of Registration, 45 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Ind. 1937).
135. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
136. Id. at 449. The Court in Barsky also stated: "The practice of medicine in New York
is lawfully prohibited by the State except upon the conditions it imposes .... It is equally
clear that a state's legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of professional conduct
extends beyond initial licensing. Without continuing supervision, initial examinations afford
little protection." Id. at 451. See also 70 C.J.S., Physiciansand Surgeons § 16 (1987).
137. 134 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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pressive and unwarranted restrictions [had] been placed upon the
conduct of his profession," 13' 8 the court upheld the Dental Act of
1940 which regulated the advertisement of dental services. In that
case, the court suggested that such regulations were virtually presumed to be within the police power. The court stated that
"[r]egulations preventing the commercialization and exploitation of
the medical professions have repeatedly been held to bear a reasonable relationship to the public health and safety." 139 The same
court also found that the practice of medicine constituted a "trade"
for purposes of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act."'4 In that case the
court said: "The practice of medicine in the District of Columbia is
subject to licensing and regulation and, we think, may not lawfully
be subjected to 'commercialization and exploitation.' ""4 In another form of commercial regulation, the Supreme Court has sustained a state law prohibiting the practice of optometry under a
trade name. 142
d. Content of practice. The just described areas of permissible
state regulation of the medical profession are still rather far removed from the actual content of the practice or the discretion of
the physician. Yet, getting closer to the heart of the practice itself,
the state has the power to establish the very definition of the practice of medicine.1 43 The state may determine what constitutes a
particular branch of medical practice. Thus, in Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co.,1 44 the Supreme Court upheld a regulation that permitted only licensed optometrists or ophthamologists to fit frames,
lenses, or other optical appliances. In assessing the due process
claim in Williamson, the Court emphasized that "[t]he day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought." 145 Rather, the
deferential test the Court applies is that "[i]t is enough that there is
an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
(1987);
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
Id. at 714.
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). See 70 C.J.S. Physiciansand Surgeons § 32
61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, Etc § 143 (1987).
Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912).
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Id. at 488.
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146
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.",
For this reason the California Supreme Court has held that the state
can ban the distribution of drugs not recognized as effective for
their intended use. 147

C. Informed Consent to Medical Treatment
The areas of pervasive government regulation of the medical
profession discussed above, licensing and revocation, commercial
aspects, and definition of practice, begin to approach the heart of
the physician's practice of his craft, his discretion and medical judgment in dealing with his patients. The law governing informed consent to medical treatment, however, goes directly to the core of the
physician's practice. Determining whether the law in this area recognizes a specially protected role for the physician's discretion and
judgment, much less an actual right to unfettered practice, requires
review of three factors: the cases and statutes themselves, their
trends, and some of the recent Supreme Court decisions in the area
of commercial speech. When these pieces are viewed in combination, the picture that emerges is that, even at the heart of the physician's practice, he does not enjoy a "right" to practice at his own
discretion. The state retains considerable authority to ensure the
integrity of medical care decision-making and to make substantive
judgments about the minimal amount of information that patients
need to receive.
1. Cases and statutes
a. The reasonable physician model. The cases and statutes
concerning informed consent to medical treatment fall into two
groups, which can be distinguished by the standard against which
the physician's disclosure is to be measured. Since actions against
physicians for failing to obtain informed consent are now based on a
146. Id.
147. People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979). In
Privitera, a medical doctor and four others had been convicted of conspiracy to sell and distribute laetrile, an unapproved drug intended for the alleviation or cure of cancer, in violation
of state statutory law. Id. at 697. The Supreme Court of California found that "a fundamental privacy right is not at stake here" because the constitutional right of privacy protects only
"independence in making certain kinds of 'important decisions.' "Id. at 702. "But the kinds
of 'important decisions' recognized by the high court to date as falling within the right of
privacy.., do not include medical treatment." Id.
For an example of an attempt to extend the right of privacy to include use of such unapproved or unproven medical treatments, see Comment, The Right to Choose an Unproven
Method of Treatment, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 227 (1979).
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negligence theory,14 and not the old battery theory,1 4 9 this model is
described in terms of the physician's duty of disclosure.
The first group of cases and statutes uses the standard of the
"reasonable physician," and holds that the duty of the physician to
disclose information to his patient is measured "with reference to
the general practice customarily followed by the medical profession
in the locality." ' Under this model, the physician's duty to disclose "is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical
practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances."' 5 1 The courts generally require expert medical testimony

to show what the reasonable practitioner in the local community
would do under the circumstances.15 2 Statutes reflecting the reasonable physician standard have required that this contention be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence."13 The reasonable physician model emphasizes the complexity of the issues, the physicianpatient relationship, the physician's special training and knowledge,
1 54
and the patient's lack of such knowledge.
148. See, ag., Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 98 (1973):
Informed consent consists of a duty imposed by law upon a physician to inform his
patient of the nature of the surgery he intends to perform, the probable consequences, risks and hazards of this procedure, and the benefits that can be anticipated from this procedure. . . . Breach of this duty is recognized as tortious
misconduct actionable as medical negligence where harm proximately results
therefrom.
149. The shift away from the battery theory of recovery for invasion of bodily integrity by
an unauthorized operation began with Salgo v. Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170
(1957). Since then, the physician not only had to gain permission to treat but had to affirmatively make certain disclosures to the patient. See generally Trojun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d
569, 595-96, 207 N.W.2d 297, 311 (Wis. 1973); McCoid, A ReappraisalofLiabilityfor Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REv. 381 (1957); Comment, New Trends in Informed Consent?, 54 NEB. L. REv. 66 (1975). Some courts still cling to the battery theory,
however. See, eg., Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 81, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 373, 409 P.2d 74, 86 (1965).
150. Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 140, 119 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1963). See Bly v.
Rhoades, 216 Va. 645, 652, 222 S.E.2d 783, 789 (1976) (rejecting a national standard in favor
of a local standard).
151. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409-10, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960) (emphasis
added).
152. See Hamor v. Maine Coast Memorial Hosp., 483 A.2d 718, 722 (Me. 1984); Bly v.
Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 652, 222 S.E.2d 783, 788 (1976); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674
(1965).
153. See, e-g., ARK. STAT. § 34-2614 (1985 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6852
(1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29 § 2905 (1985-86 Supp.); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2816
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (1984 Supp.).
154. See, e.g., Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tenn. 1974); Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960) ("How the physician may best discharge his
obligation to his patient in this difficult situation involves primarily a question of medical
judgment.").
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Therefore, the reasonable physician model generally places great
emphasis on the discretion and judgment of the physician. Such
judgment forms the basis of the standard for determining whether a
physician has breached the duty to disclose. However, since the
shift from the battery theory to the negligence theory, this standard
has imposed a duty, as measured by the standards of the profession,
to disclose information to the patient. The state can enforce this
duty through the common law or statutes.
b. The reasonable patient model. The second group of cases
and statutes, in contrast, uses the standard of the "reasonable patient," and generally holds that "[t]he physician is bound to disclose
... those risks which a reasonableman would consider material to
his decision whether or not to undergo treatment."' 5 5 Underlying
this model is an emphasis on the individual dignity and autonomy
of the patient who has the right to make decisions regarding his or
56
her own body. 1
The reasonable patient line of cases emphasizes that the "patient's right to make his decision in the light of his own individual
15
value judgment is the very essence of his freedom of choice."' 1
Under this model, the materiality of the information to the patient's
decision, rather than the physician's medical judgment, is the measure of the physician's duty to disclose. 15 8 Statutes reflecting the
reasonable patient model require that physicians disclose information about the intended procedure, its risks, and alternatives.' 5 9
Some states have recently enacted statutes based on the reasonable
patient model for specific contexts or conditions like breast can155. Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 267-68, 286 A.2d 647, 650-51 (1971) (emphasis added).
156. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosps., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914): "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body ..
" Schloendorffrepresents the old battery theory. For a
similar emphasis underlying the negligence theory, see Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 439, 379
A.2d 1014, 1019-20 (1977); Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 104 (1973); Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960).
157. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 624, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972). See also Comment, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient Participationin Medical Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 172, 174 (1981): "Today most courts recognize that the patient's
right to decide is the sine qua non of informed consent."
158. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Holland v. Sisters of Saint Joseph of Peace, 270 Or. 192, 137, 522 P.2d 208, 211
(1974); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 282, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (1974) ("The scope of
the duty to disclose information ... is measured by the patients' need to know.").
159. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (1983 Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.40 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN § 144.651 (1987 Supp.) (very detailed statute); OR.
REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1981).
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cer. 16 ° The diversity of such statutes demonstrates that, outside the
abortion context, states take an active role in making judgments
about the minimum amount and kinds of information that patients
should be told. By making such judgments, states protect the public health and the integrity of medical care decision-making.
Although such statutes do not always conform to the precise informational needs of every individual patient in every possible setting,
the state unquestionably has the authority to make judgments,
based on a reasonable patient perspective, about what patients generally need to know in order to make a minimally informed decision
about medical treatment. Dissenting in Thornburgh, Justice White
observed: "Legislators are ordinarily entitled to proceed on the basis of rational generalizations about the subject matter of legislation,
and the existence of particular cases in which a feature of a statute
performs no function [or is even counterproductive] ordinarily does
not render the statute unconstitutional or even constitutionally
16 1
suspect."'
Clearly, under the reasonable patient model, the physician's
judgment and discretion are less important than the patient's need
to know. This statement is true even in those medical contexts in
which the indications for and consequences of certain medical procedures or treatments are strictly medical in nature. The physician's duty to disclose strictly medical information in these
situations is still conditioned upon the patient's decisional needs.
Common sense suggests that the less medical the patient's decision
is, the less the patient will need the physician's expert knowledge.
Room for legislative judgments as to the amount and kinds of information necessary for minimally informed consent only increases.
The reasonable patient model, then, suggests an orientation focused more on the patient's rights and a consumer/contract style of
medical care delivery. 1 62 While there exist some narrowly defined
160. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1704.5; GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-21(g)
(1984); FLA. STAT. § 458.324(2) (1984); N.Y. Public Health Law § 2404 (McKinney 1985);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2-2 (1987 Supp.).
161. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169,
2199 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
162. See Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 267, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (1971). It is this
reality of the changing nature of the doctor-patient relationship which the Supreme Court in
Roe seems to ignore. Professor Stone writes: "In [Roe], Blackmun had used the phrase 'attending physician' to describe the doctor who would make the abortion decision. This language conjures up an earlier time when patients actually had a personal physician who
attended them at bedside both at home and in the hospital, but is certainly an inapt phrase for
describing doctors who perform abortion procedures in clinics." Stone, supra note 5, at 581.
See infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
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exceptions in some reasonable patient jurisdictions, including emergencies, incompetency, or therapeutic reasons, 163 the basic rule
under the reasonable patient model is that "a physician.., has a...
duty to disclose all facts, risks, and alternatives that a reasonable
person in the patient's situation would deem significant in determining whether to undergo treatment. ' 6 The state may codify this
rule and make substantive judgments about the minimum amount
of information patients generally should receive. The less a medical
procedure's indications and consequences are purely medical, the
greater the need for and legitimacy of such state judgments.
2.

The doctrinal trend

The second factor to consider in assessing the relative importance of physician discretion in the area of informed consent to
medical treatment is the trend of the doctrine. Without question,
the trend is away from the reasonable physician model and toward
the reasonable patient model.1 6 5 Commentators have documented
66
this trend from the old battery theory to the negligence theory.'
Within the negligence area, the trend is toward the reasonable patient model. Moreover, most commentators have noted this shift
with approval. 167 Jo Anne Morrow writes:
Doctors have not been permitted to act totally without review for
a quarter of a century.... It seems unreasonable that the person
most concerned, the patient, should have only that information
the doctor, no matter how well-intentioned, decides she should
have.... By retaining the authoritative role in the doctor-patient relationship, the doctor denies
168 the patient the right to make
decisions that affect her body.
This contention closely parallels the emphasis of the district court
in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth that a statutory informed consent requirement " 'insures that the pregnant woman re163. See Meisel, "The Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance
Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413.
164. Note, The Abortion Alternative and the Patient'sRight to Know, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q.

167, 184.
165. Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis ofRecent
Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407 (1980); Comment, New Trends in Informed Consent, 54
NEB. L. REV. 66 (1975).
166. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 165, at 67-72.
167. Some commentators would see the trend continue beyond mere information disclosure to actual patient participation in the decisionmaking. See Comment, Informed Consent:
From Disclosure to Patient Participationin Medical Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 172

(1981).
168. Note, Women's Health Care and Informed Consent: Who Should Decide What is
Best for Women-Patients or Doctors?, 9 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 553, 575 (1978-79).
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tains control over the discretions of her consulting physician.' "169
Among the reasons commentators cite for approving this trend are
its emphasis on personal dignity and control over one's own
body,17 ° the unequal information status of the physician and patient,17 and the "danger that physicians will exploit patients 1by
72
subjecting them to treatment that is not in their best interests."'
In sum, while a number of jurisdictions continue to adhere to
the reasonable physician standard, a substantial and growing
number have opted for the reasonable patient standard.
3.

Commercialspeech

Finally, consistent with the spirit of the trend toward fuller disclosure based on the materiality of the information to the patient's
decision about medical treatment, some recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of commercial speech make clear the Court's preference for fuller disclosure, so long as the information is not false or
deceptive. The public's lack of information and the inability or refusal of the professions to police themselves has prompted the Court
to adopt an attitude leaning toward fuller disclosure. 173 Likewise,
the Court has held that there is a only minimal interest in not providing particular factual information. 17 4 These concerns are relevant in the medical context, because of the contractual nature of the
contemporary physician-patient relationship in general, and are
even greater where important considerations and related information are non-medical in nature.
In cases involving commercial speech, a state restriction on the
physician might be invalid because of its effect on the patient/consumer of health care. Significantly, however, the Court
has corrected the perceived constitutional defect in these cases by
requiring that more, not less, information be given to the patient/consumer so that he or she will be able to make a better decision. The Court has not required that more deference be given to
the physician, nor has the Court contemplated the possibility of further restriction of relevant information. In contrast, the Court's
169. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth
392 F. Supp. 1362, 1369).
170. Comment, supra note 165, at 74; Note, supra note 168, at 575-76.
171. Comment, Informed Consent in Washington: Expanded Scope of MaterialFacts
That the PhysicianMust Disclose to His Patient, 55 WASH. L. REv. 655, 657 (1980).
172. Comment, supra note 168, at 175.
173. See, eg., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
174. See, eg., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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abortion cases suggest that the Constitution somehow forbids the
expansion of information for the patient within this particular context. The Court has never explained or justified this fundamental
inconsistency.
Although physician disclosure of information to patients involves a physician's discretion and judgment, the trend of informed
consent law and the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases suggest that the medical profession can be legitimately subject to extensive public control. Therefore, a claim of a constitutionally
significant "right" to practice medicine by one's unfettered discretion is unfounded.
The Court fails to explain why the Constitution itself apparently
mandates the application of an extreme version of the outdated reasonable physician model in the abortion context, while states remain free to choose their preferred approach outside that context.
The Court does not even explain how the Constitution is related to
this inquiry. Rather, the Court's conclusion is merely stated. Even
assuming that the preference for one approach over the other is of
constitutional import, many arguments support the application of
the reasonable patient model in the abortion context.
D. Summary
Outside the abortion context, physicians do not enjoy a constitutionally protected right to practice medicine by their own unfettered
discretion. Even "an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in
the practice of his profession" as asserted in Danforth 1" or "unduly
oppressive and unwarranted restrictions... upon the conduct of his
profession" as asserted in JohnstonI7 6 have not been held to be constitutionally forbidden. Rather, the police power of the state has
traditionally justified many such controls on the profession.
In addition, the law of informed consent to medical treatment
outside the abortion context is shifting from the reasonable physician model, with its heavy emphasis on the physician's discretion, to
the reasonable patient model. Under this standard, the materiality
of information to the patient's decision, rather than the physician's
discretion, is the measure of the physician's disclosure duty. Recent
decisions by the Supreme Court on commercial speech likewise support the emphasis on greater knowledge by the patient/consumer
and downplay interests in non-disclosure of information by physi175. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8.
176. 134 F.2d at 10.
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cians. The state has authority to make judgments, based on the reasonable patient model, about the minimum kinds and amount of
information patients must be told for their consent to be informed.
The state's role increases when the strictly medical nature of the
indications and consequences of medical procedures decreases.
The fact that, in the abortion context, the Supreme Court finds
informed consent statutes unconstitutional because of their effect on
the discretion of the physician is at odds with traditional jurisprudence. This approach fails to establish why the Constitution requires any particular model and why an increasingly outmoded and
inappropriate model is the Constitution's substantive choice. Justice White, dissenting in Danforth, stated that traditional rules and
methods of constitutional interpretation should not be discarded
merely because the case before the Court concerns abortion. 177
However, the Court seems to take just this approach when reviewing informed consent provisions.
The first of the Supreme Court's two "equally decisive" reasons
for invalidating informed consent to abortion statutes, their effect
on the physician's discretion, is totally unjustified. The second is
that such statutes actually interfere with the woman's right of
choice between abortion and childbirth. The next step in this analysis will be to examine the abortion right itself, the nature of abortion, and the context in which the abortion right is sought to be
exercised. This investigation will provide further insight into the
proper method for evaluating the constitutionality of informed consent to abortion statutes. Although the Court bases its abortion decisions on the reasonable physician model, the reasonable patient
model is clearly more appropriate. Not only should states be free to
select the model on which to base their statutes, but compelling reasons argue in favor of the model they have indeed chosen in the
abortion context: the reasonable patient model.
IV.

ANALYZING THE COURT'S REASONS: INTERFERENCE WITH
THE WOMAN'S RIGHT

A.

The Abortion Right

Despite the confusion in the Supreme Court's abortion doctrine
noted at the outset, a careful analysis of the Court's abortion decisions reveals an underlying framework. The Court's language, if
not its holdings, lends itself to some kind of organization. This
177. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 98 (White, J., dissenting).
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analysis makes clear that the core of the abortion right is a woman's
freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy by abortion
or continue it to childbirth. The Court's abortion decisions are replete with expressions of the basic notion that Roe established freedom of choice between alternative ways of ending a pregnancy:
abortion or childbirth.1 78 At the very least, therefore, state action
that literally proscribes either choice, for example, by making it
criminal for a physician to perform abortions, is clearly unconstitutional. 179 This unconstitutionality does not arise because a physician has an affirmative constitutional right to perform abortions; it
arises merely because the involvement of a third party, in this case a
physician, is necessary for the woman to exercise and effectuate her
constitutional right of choice. State regulations directed at the physician should not be invalidated unless they improperly infringe
upon or burden the woman's constitutionalright. The physician has
no such right independent of the patient. Because the nature of the
abortion right is freedom of decision, the state may not foreclose
either option.
The Supreme Court has, at the same time, held that this right is
not absolute.180 Indeed, the abortion right has been limited, at least
rhetorically, in a variety of ways. For example, a woman does not
have a right to an abortion performed by anyone other than a licensed physician.1 81 Also, the state may require that the physician
178. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312, 313, 314-15, 316, 317-18 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 639 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 600 n.26 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80, 95 (1976); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 165-66 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp.
554, 563, 564, 565, 580 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901
(1976).
179. Courts have repeatedly said that actual state-created obstacles to the woman's
choice are unconstitutional. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409, 411 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70-71 n.10, 74; Akron Center for Reproductive Health
v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1200 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 565, 568 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 429
U.S. 901 (1976).
180. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10 (1975) (per curiam); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Gary-Northwest
Indiana Women's Services v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894, 900 (N.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981); Planned Parenthood
v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick,
428 U.S. 901 (1976).
181. See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 216
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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obtain the written consent of a woman before performing an abortion."8 2 The abortion funding cases1 83 make clear that the woman
does not enjoy such an abstract "right to an abortion" that the state
must pay for them whenever she cannot. To the contrary, the state
is under no obligation to pay for abortions, and can legitimately
encourage the alternative choice of childbirth, in which the Court
8 4
has acknowledged the state has a particularly strong interest.'
Such a policy is permissible even when restriction of public funds
185
"results" in unavailability of abortions services for some women.
The abortion option may not be foreclosed nor may the choice
of that option be unduly burdened. Nevertheless, abortion is not a
positive "good" that the state is obliged to encourage or make more
attractive. In Roe, inclusion of abortion in the right to privacy was
apparently based on its being a way to avoid certain "detriments"
that childbirth and childrearing might involve. 86 Chief Justice
Burger, in his Thornburgh dissent, noted the majority's "astounding
rationale" for striking down the informed consent provisions that
some of the required information "might have the effect of 'discouraging abortion' . .. as if abortion [was] something to be advocated
and encouraged."18' 7 He countered that the Constitution does not
require states to facilitate or encourage abortion but instead permits
states to promote the alternative choice by encouraging childbirth. 8 Likewise, Justice White observed:
[P]recisely because Roe v. Wade is not premised on the notion
that abortion is itself desirable (either as a matter of constitu182. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
183. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977).
184. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412-13 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 32425 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473, 477
(1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977).
185. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). In Maher, Justice Povyell acknowledged that "some" women might not be able to have abortions when the funding restrictions
under the Hyde Amendment were enforced. The Alan Guttmacher Institute, the research
arm of the Planned Parenthood Federation, estimates that approximately 100,000 women
were unable to obtain abortions in 1978 because of the funding restrictions under the Hyde
Amendment. See Trussell, Mentum, Lendheim & Vaughan, Impact of Restricting Medicaid
Financingfor Abortion, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 120, 120 (May-June 1980). It should be
noted, however, that none of the predictions by abortion proponents of increased maternal
morbidity or mortality resulting from the funding restrictions came true. See 129 CONG.
REC. S9255, 9286 (daily ed. June 28, 1983); J. BURTCHAELL, RACHEL WEEPING AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON ABORTION 67 (1982).

186. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
187. Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2191 n.* (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
188. Id.
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tional entitlement or of social policy), the decision does not command the States to fund or encourage abortion, or even to
approve of it. Rather, we have recognized that the States may
legitimately adopt a policy of encouraging normal childbirth
rather than abortion so long as the measures through which that
policy is implemented do not amount 18to9 direct compulsion of the
woman's choice regarding abortion."
This array of limitations on a woman's right to choose her
method of pregnancy termination shows that a state, even if it theoretically could,1 9° does not need to remain entirely neutral with respect to the particular choice being made.
Abortion is unlike any other situation implicating the "right to
privacy" because of the presence and development of the preborn
child,' 91 in which the state retains at all times at least an "important" interest. As such, the state has a set of interests entirely absent in other contexts. The significance of these state interests in the
abortion context means, as the Court explicitly recognized in the
funding cases, that the state can seek to further its preference for
childbirth through a variety of means.
This situation naturally leads to two observations. First, consistent analysis emphasizing information relevent to the decision
rather than the relatively "encouraging" or "discouraging" nature
of such information is necessary for the true nature of the right to
be maintained and for these important state interests not to be unduly limited by the Court's policy preferences.' 92 Second, the
Court's recent decision in Thornburgh is wholly unjustifiable because it is based on the Court's negative view of Pennsylvania's presumed statutory motive rather than the relevant impact and
demonstrative unconstitutionality of its statutory scheme. Chief
Justice Burger's defection to the dissenters' ranks is perhaps the
189. Id. at 2198 (White, J., dissenting).
190. Even information "as to just what would be done and as to its consequences," Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8, that the Court approved is not neutral. Such information alone
could readily tip the decisional balance in either direction, depending on the knowledge, preferences, values, and other characteristics of the woman. One commentator, making the same
mistake as the Court, spoke of "neutral information relevant to a woman's decision."
George, supra note 16, at 35. However, "neutral" information can hardly be relevant. It is
precisely because information is material, that is, can influence the decision, that it is relevant
and should be considered.
191. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
192. Justice White stated in his Thornburgh dissent that "the unrestrained imposition of
[the Court's] own, extraconstitutional value preferences" began in Roe with denominating the
liberty to choose abortion as fundamental. Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2196 (white, J., dissenting). See supra note 21.
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most poignant evidence of just how far afield the Court has gone in
mandating preferred results without reasoned or consistent analysis.
The Supreme Court has also rejected the argument that the

abortion right means an absolute "right to control one's own body."
Indeed, the Court has held that this notion has little, if anything, to
do with the privacy cases at all. 193 Because of the presence and
development of the preborn child, this argument has even less relevance in the abortion context. A three-judge federal panel has likewise rejected the notion that the abortion right means a
constitutional right, in any particular case, to actually kill the

fetus. 194
The nature of the abortion right cannot be described merely by
reference to other medical procedures or treatment, even though
abortion is undeniably a medical procedure. Just as the abortion
right is inherently different from other privacy rights because of the
presence and development of the preborn child, so abortion is different from other medical procedures because it involves the termination of the life of the preborn child. Although the Court's early
decisions seem to suggest otherwise,1 95 a state may treat abortion
differently from other medical procedures. 9 6 In Danforth, for example, the Court upheld the requirement of written informed consent for abortion even though such consent is not required for any
other surgical procedure. 197
The abortion right is further limited by the state's interests in
maternal health and fetal life, which become compelling at certain
193. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
194. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1978), appeal dism'd, Carey v.
Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.
1979).
195. The Supreme Court, in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), invalidated a requirement that the decision by a physician that an abortion was necessary be reviewed by a committee and stated: "We are not cited to any other surgical procedure made subject to
committee approval as a matter of state criminal law." Id. at 197.
196. See, eg., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412-13, 422-23 (1981); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41, 643, 649 (1979); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67, 103
(1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 149 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F.
Supp. 554, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nom., Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
In contrast to its emphasis in Doe, see supra note 195, the Court in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), upheld a requirement that a physician obtain written informed
consent from the patient before performing an abortion, despite the fact that such a requirement existed for virtually no other surgical procedure. Id. at 66. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977), the Court said: "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements
are not imposed for other medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Id. at 480.
197. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66-67.
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points during pregnancy and are then sufficient in themselves to justify more extensive regulation.19 8 Another significant anomaly in
the Court's abortion doctrine is that, while it defines "health" very
broadly when that term is used to justify a woman's decision to
have an abortion,' 99 it utilizes a much more narrow definition of
"health" when that term is used to justify state regulation after the
first trimester in furthering its interest in maternal health." ° Because such statutes are justified by their relation to the state's interest in the preservation of maternal health, they affect the informed
consent situation.20 1 Consistent application of the broader definition would allow the state to protect the varied aspects of "health"
implicated when the abortion decision is being made." 2 The state
could ensure that the information relating to the broader, less medical, aspects of health that go into the decision whether to abort are
provided so a better decision for many women will result.
Finally, as the previous section demonstrates, the abortion right
is not a physician's right to practice medicine according to his unfettered discretion. Although some dicta exists suggesting the existence of such a right, 0 3 the Court has specifically held that whatever
"right" a physician may be said to possess in the abortion context is
entirely derivative from the woman's right to have her decision effectuated. 2 ' The Court's recent creation of an "equally decisive"
198. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163, 164-65.
199. Beginning with United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), the Court has held that
"health" should be understood, not in medical or strictly clinical terms, but in terms of "general usage and modern understanding" to include psychological as well as physical "soundness." Id. at 72. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court expanded on this idea to
hold that, in the abortion context, "the medical judgement may be exercised in the light of all
factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevent to the
well-being of the patient. All these factors relate to health." Id. at 192.
200. The state's interest in maternal health becomes compelling only when the mortality
rate for abortion is no longer less than the mortality rate for normal childbirth. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
201. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443 (1983).
202. It should again be noted that this argument for a consistent use of the Court's broad
definition of "health" is premised on the assumption of Roe's continued existence. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text. Those pursuing a litigation strategy to accomplish Roe's
reversal, conversely, seek "to limit the scope of criteria which may justify an abortion on
grounds of 'maternal health.'" Rosenblum & Marzen, Strategiesfor Reversing Roe v. Wade
in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS,
supra note 15, at 199.
203. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
204. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977):
Nothing in [Doe v. Bolton] suggests that a doctor's right to administer medical care
has any greater strength than his patient's right to receive such care. The constitutional right vindicated in Doe was the right of a pregnant woman to decide whether
or not to bear a child without unwarranted state interference. The statutory restric-
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and separate reason for invalidating informed consent provisions
because of their effect on the physician's discretion is, therefore,
quite astonishing. As the district court in Danforth had emphasized, it is vital that the woman retain control over her physician's
discretion; 20 5 coercion by a man in a white coat should be no less
suspect than coercion by legislators in a state capitol.
When the Court in its abortion decisions discusses the physician's discretion or medical judgment, it always does so in the context of the woman's right of choice; usually in the same sentence.20 6
This observation provides more support for the view that there is no
independent "right of the physician" but, rather, that any physician's "right" in the abortion context is derivative from and dependent upon the woman's fight. It is only because the exercise of that
right and its effectuation requires the technical services of a thirdparty professional that the physician is in the picture in the first
place. Regulation of the physician should be held unconstitutional
to the extent that it impermissibly affects the woman's right of
choice. The Court's willingness to invalidate informed consent
abortion statutes because of their effect on the discretion of the physician 20 7 remains a fundamental flaw in its abortion doctrine.
The Court has developed an "unduly burdensome" standard
which it uses to measure the constitutionality of state abortion regulations, and which can consistently reflect the true nature of the
abortion right and also recognize, but not subordinate, the other
important interests involved.20 8 Under this standard, strict judicial
tions on the abortion procedures were invalid because they encumbered the woman's exercise of that constitutionally protected right.... If those obstacles had
not impacted upon the woman's freedom to make a constitutionally protected decision, if they had merely made the physician's work more laborious or less independent without any impact on the patient, they would not have violated the
Constitution.
See supra note 45.
205. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66.
206. See, &g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 429-30
(1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1979); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11
(1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197, 199 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973);
Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 564, 569 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub
noma.Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
207. See supra notes 45, 102 and accompanying text.
208. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640
(1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976);
Birth Control Centers v. Reizen, 508 F. Supp. 1366, 1379-80 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 743
F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1984). This standard is not unlike the "unfair prejudice" test of the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403. It allows burdens on the abortion right but finds
undue burdens unconstitutional. This approach makes sense, since "burden" could easily be
construed to mean any "effect" or interface at all. Likewise, Professor Wardle emphasizes
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scrutiny is approptiate only when a regulation unduly burdens the
right of choice and a compelling state interest is necessary to justify
such scrutiny. Under this standard, actual foreclosure of the abortion option by statutory prohibition would unduly burden the
choice. Strict judicial scrutiny would render such a regulation presumptively invalid unless it was supported by a compelling state
interest. Under the Roe trimester framework, an interest sufficient
to even potentially justify a prohibition on abortion exists only after
viability, when the state's interest in fetal life becomes compelling.2°9 This conclusion holds whether the performance of an abortion is criminalized 2 10 or a unilateral veto power over the woman's
decision is given to a third party.2 11 In either case, the state is literally acting to foreclose the abortion option without regard to other
circumstances.
In her dissent in Akron, Justice O'Connor urged consistent application of the "unduly burdensome" test as a way of preserving
the true nature of the fundamental right while not imposing the
Court's particular value choices on state legislatures and frustrating
important state interests.2 12 In his Thornburgh dissent, Justice
White also argued that nothing in the dispute triggered strict judicial scrutiny because the informed consent provision "does not directly infringe the allegedly fundamental right at issue-the
woman's right to choose an abortion. 21 3 The district court in Fitzpatrick applied the rational relationship test rather than strict judicial scrutiny because the informed consent provision at issue did not
"chill the exercise of the abortion option."2'1 4 The Supreme Court
has applied this test in abortion cases involving issues other than
informed consent.215 Lower federal courts have applied it.2 16 State
that the test is whether an informed consent requirement is detrimentally burdensome, not
whether it merely effects the choice. L. WARDLE, supra note 5, at 103.
209. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
210. The statute invalidated in Roe made it a crime to perform all abortions except those
that were to save the life of the mother. Id. at 118 n. 1. Similar statutes had been enacted in a
majority of states. Id.
211. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439, 442
(1983) (parental consent); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1976) (spousal and parental
consent).
212. Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
213. Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2199-200 (White, J., dissenting).
214. Fitzpatrick, 401 F.Supp. at 587 (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting).
215. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 640 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132,
147 (1976).
216. See, e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1215 (6th
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courts have applied it. In Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowit, 217 for
example, the Suprerhe Court of Illinois stated: "The fundamental
right here involved, of course, is a woman's privacy right to decide
... whether to obtain an abortion. As to those abortion regulations
which do not unduly burden that fundamental right, the Supreme
Court has applied only a rational-basis test."'2 18 Commentators
have also identified this scheme as a central part of the Court's
abortion doctrine. Professor Mark Tushnet describes what he calls
"a unified approach" this way: "[The Court] has prohibited regulations that unduly burden the decision to have or to refrain from
having an abortion. The 'unduly burden' approach has been applied in three groups of cases. ' 219 Discussing the constitutionality
of informed consent provisions in 1980, another writer emphasized
that the burden on the abortion right must be "undue" to trigger
strict scrutiny and that a compelling state interest is then
required. 2 0
Regulations that do not foreclose options but only indirectly affect the making of the choice in some way should be treated differently. The Court, in the funding cases, 2 2 has recognized this
difference between the state affirmatively setting up a barrier and
acting in other ways that only affect the decision itself indirectly. A
relative burden is different from a total denial; 2 2 limited access is
different from prohibited access.2 2 3
A statute is not unconstitutional if it merely deals with the subject of abortion.224 It is not unconstitutional if it merely affects the
abortion decision. It is not unconstitutional if it can be said merely
to "burden" that decision. Consistent use of the "unduly burdensome" standard would mean that those regulations that do not
amount to undue burdens should be evaluated according to the socalled "rational relationship" test: as long as there is a problem in
need of correction perceived by the legislature and the means chosen bears a rational relationship to that end, the statute is constituCir. 1981) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Birth Control Centers v. Reizen, 508 F. Supp. 1366,
1379-80 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 743 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1984).
217. 86 Ill. 2d 406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981).
218. Id. at 416-17, 427 N.E.2d at 40.
219. Tushnet, supra note 15, at 162.
220. Comment, The Maine Abortion Statutes of 1979: Testing the ConstitutionalLimits,
32 ME. L. REV. 315, 323 (1980).
221. See supra note 183.
222. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976).
223. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977). See also Akron Center for Reproductive
Health v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1200 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
224. See supra 177 note and accompanying text.
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tional under the due process clause.2 25
Looking only at whether a statute "burdens" or "affects" the
woman's freedom of choice, and not at the nature of the burden or
the significance of the effect, and automatically applying de facto
strict scrutiny, as the Court has begun to do in Akron and Thornburgh with respect to informed consent provisions, is inappropriate.
It makes the imagination and policy preferences of the Court the
measure of constitutionality at the expense of important state interests, consistently applicable analysis, and proper deference to legislative judgments.
The proper analysis requires focusing on the nature of the right
and to whom it belongs. Achieving the proper outcome of that
analysis with respect to informed consent statutes requires further
attention to the nature of abortion and the reality of the context
within which the abortion right is sought to be exercised.
B.

The Nature of Abortion

Abortion is, of course, a medical procedure in that it is a procedure performed by physicians.22 6 It is the most commonly performed surgical procedure in the United States today 227 but it is not
medically indicated in at least ninety-eight percent of cases. 228 That
225. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
226. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192,
197, 199, 215, 220 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148, 163, 166 (1973).
227. See generally STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1987, at 98 (107th
ed. 1987); U.S. DEFT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 33
(1985); T. MADDEN, I. TURNER & E. ECKENFELS, THE HEALTH ALMANAC 153 (1982). See
also F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS: PRIVATE MORALITY AND

PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1981) (By 1978, "[tlermination of pregnancy had become the most frequently performed operation on adults in the United States."); L. WARDLE & M. WOOD, A
LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION 8 (1982) ("Abortion is now the most frequently performed

operation in the United States.").
228. This fact is accepted by both abortion proponents and opponents. In testimony
before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution in October 1981, abortion advocate
Dr. Irving M. Cushner of the U.C.L.A. School of Public Health and director of the women's
health division of the School of Medicine's Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, stated
that "something on the order of 2 percent of all the abortions in this country are done for
some clinically identifiable entity-physical health problem, amniocentesis, and identified genetic disease or something of that kind. The overwhelming majority of abortions in this
country are performed on women who for various reasons do not wish to be pregnant at this
time .... Their reasons are a mixture of social, economic, educational, or whatever." In
response to the question of how often abortions are performed to save the life of the mother
or to ensure her physical health, Dr. Cushner replied: "In this country, it is about 1 percent."
Hearings, supra note 11, at 158.
Likewise, abortion opponent Dr. Bernard N. Nathanson, a practicing obstetrician/gynecologist and clinical professor at the Cornell University College of Medicine, testified that "there are only a few medical reasons for abortion.... I do not think there are
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is, the procedure is not required for either physical22 9 or psychological health reasons.2 3 ° Rather, it more properly compares to elective
surgery.2 3 ' It was in this context that the shift in the informed consent doctrine from the reasonable physician model to the reasonable
patient model first began.232 Of course, abortion may be deemed
significant or necessary for other, non-medical reasons. However,
abortion, from the clinical or medical perspective, is not medically
indicated. Therefore, the physician's special training and judgment
really any abortions designed for the mother's health." Id. at 172-73. Dr. Nathanson has
personally performed more than 5,000 abortions, supervised the performance of at least
10,000 more, and was responsible for 60,000 more as director of the world's busiest abortion
clinic in New York City in the early 1970s. Id. at 169. The Supreme Court has called Dr.
Nathanson "a widely experienced abortion practitioner." Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 489 (1983).
See also Hearings,supra note 11, at 194 (statement of Dr. Thomas W. Hilgers, professor
of obstetrics and gynecology at the Creighton University School of Medicine): "[The overwhelming number of abortions are not being performed for any medical reasons."); id. at 267
(statement of the late Dr. Jasper F. Williams, Sr., chairman of the department of obstetrics
and gynecology at Chicago's Bernard Hospital and a practicing obstetrician/gynecologist):
"[T]he number of medical cases in which abortion is an indicated and appropriate part of the
treatment is practically nil"; Mecklenburg, The Indicationsfor Induced Abortion: A Physician's Perspective,in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 39 (T. Hilgers & D. Horan eds. reprint
1980) ("[T]here are very rare and very individual circumstances which may require therapeutic abortion in order to save the life of the mother.").
James Burtchaell surveyed the research and expert opinion on this subject and concluded
that abortion is medically indicated in 1% of cases, or less. He writes: "Abortion, legal or
criminal, serves no one's health, and is no medical matter-unless those words are stretched
beyond their ordinary meanings. In perhaps 99% of present cases it is medical only in virtue
of being performed by a physician." J. BURTCHAELL, supra note 185, at 68.
229. See J. BURTCHAELL, supra note 185, at 68-72; Mecklenburg, supra note 228, at 3941.
230. This fact has been known for some two decades, and medical opinion has not
changed. In 1963, Dr. Myre Sim noted that in 15 years' experience in Britain "there were no
clear psychiatric indications for termination of pregnancy." Sim, Abortion and the Psychiatrist, BRIT. MED. J. 145 (20 July 1963). Irving C. Bernstein, a professor of both psychiatry
and obstetrics/gynecology at the University of Minnesota, stated: "From the psychiatric
point of view of the psychiatrist, there are no indications for recommending therapeutic abortions." Abortion-Part2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalAmendments of
the Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 335, 336 (1974). Dr. Sim has written more
recently that "the 'mental' argument has no basis as an indication for abortion." Sim &
Neisser, Post-AbortivePsychosis: A Report From Two Centers, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE ABORTION 11 (D. Mall ed. 1979).
Dr. Bernard N. Nathanson, as founder of the National Abortion Rights Action League,
was a leading advocate of using loopholes in liberalized state abortion laws to get abortions
performed on what were claimed as "psychiatric" grounds. He now admits this practice was
completely fraudulent. B. NATHANSON, ABORTING AMERICA 191, 240-41 (1979).
231. Dr. Nathanson has testified that abortion "can be likened best to cosmetic surgery
where a woman will visit the plastic surgeon and tell him what she wishes to have done."
Hearings,supra note 11, at 172.
232. See, eg., Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), aff'd sub nom.
Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W. 2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
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are obviously less important within the abortion context than with
most other medical procedures. For these reasons, the reasonable
patient model is particularly appropriate.
The reasonable patient model suggests what courts have recognized in the past: the abortion decision is made on the basis of a
whole host of factors that have essentially nothing to do with
medicine. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe recognized
this and listed some of the relevant factors, 3 3 while Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Doe listed others.2 34 Most of these factors are non-medical in nature. The Court has, therefore, adopted a
definition of "health" as meaning "relating to well-being" in the
broadest possible sense. 235 This should not be taken, however, to
mean, as the Court apparently has, that the physician's particular
medical judgment and discretion is any more relevant or central.
As one commentator has stated, the Court in Roe "justified the expansion of the right [of privacy] on the basis of the significant impact on the lifestyle of the woman if she were denied the choice to
have an abortion.

236

The Court's dichotomous definition of "health" lies at the heart
of its inappropriate review of informed consent statutes. The Court
defines "health," as it relates to a woman's decision whether to have
an abortion, so broadly as to mean general well-being or lifestyle
preference, thus including a broad array of non-medical considerations. However, the Court defines the same term, as it relates the
state's interest in maternal health underlying certain regulations,
very narrowly. This latter definition is limited to physical health
and risk of death, thus encompassing only a small range of strictly
medical factors. In Roe, the Court placed the point at which the
state's interest in maternal health becomes compelling at the end of
the first trimester "because of the now-established medical fact...
that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be
less than mortality in normal childbirth.

'237

On its face, a "fact"

that something "may be" true hardly seems sufficient as a basis for a
constitutional rule. In the abortion context, this denies the state
virtually any opportunity to safeguard maternal health (broadly or
narrowly defined) during the period when more than ninety percent
233. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
234. Doe, 410 U.S. at 214-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

235. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
236. Comment, The Right to Choose An Unproven Method of Treatment, 13 Loy. L. A. L.
REV. 227, 230 (1979).
237. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
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of abortions are performed-the first trimester. Maternal mortality
from abortion continues nonetheless, 2 38 as does the real debate over

which method of pregnancy termination, abortion or childbirth, is
actually safer for most women. 23 9 That abortion is safer for women
in the first trimester can hardly be said to be the established medical
fact the Court thought it was in 1973. More importantly, the
Court's radical definitional dichotomy is nowhere justified in any of
its abortion decisions. The Court's emphasis on the state's interest

in maternal health as the basis for informed consent requirement,
coupled with its failure to appropriately apply the "unduly burdensome" test, will severly limit the state's ability to ensure the integrity of the abortion decision-making process.

Medical

complications

in

the

physical, 240

emotional/

238. See Kaunitz, Causes of Maternal Mortality in the United States, 65 OBSTET. &
GYNECOL. 605 (1985).

239. Some researchers claim that abortion is safer than childbirth. See, eg., LeBolt, Mortalityfrom Abortion and Childbirth, 248 J.A.M.A. 188 (1982). As a rejoinder to this article,
see Laska, Mortality From Abortion and Childbirth, 250 J.A.M.A. 361 (1983).
Several factors must be noted to put this issue in better perspective. First, evidence exists
that abortion mortality is underreported. Eleven deaths from abortion were reported to the
abortion surveillance unit of the Centers for Disease Control in 1978. Hearings,supra note
11, vol. 2, at 602. An investigation of just four Chicago abortion clinics in 1978, however,
turned up 12 abortion deaths that had never been reported. Zekman & Warrick, 12 Die After
Abortions in State's Walk-in Clinics, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 19, 1978. Political scientist
Hadley Arkes comments: "If, as we suspect, the experience in Chicago can find modest
duplication in New York, Detroit, Los Angeles and other cities, the total deaths due to legal
abortion may now exceed the number of deaths that were thought to occur each year as a
result of illegal abortions."

H. ARKES, THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE CITY: THE MORAL

DIMENSIONS OF URBAN POLITICS 437 (1981). See also Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Human Life Federalism Amendment, S. No. 465, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1982).
Second, the formulas used to compare maternal mortality from childbirth and from abortion may be biased to show more favorable results for abortion. See 129 CONG. REC. S927071 (daily ed. June 28, 1983) (affidavit of Dr. Richard G. Moutvic M.D., Professor, Loyola
University, Stritch School of Medicine). See also Hilgers & O'Hare,Abortion Related Maternal Mortality: An In-Depth Analysis in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 90 (T.
Hilgers, D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1981): "In comparing the relative risk of natural pregnancy versus that of legal abortion, naturalpregnancy was found to be safer in both the first
and second 20 weeks ofpregnancy. The data used in this comparison are thought to be more
accurate than previously compiled comparisons done in the traditional fashion." Cf. Cates,
Smith, Rochat, & Grimes, Mortalityfrom Abortion and Childbirth: Are the Statistics Biased?
248 J.A.M.A. 192 (1982).
240. See A. SALTENBERGER, EVERY WOMAN HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE DANGERS
OF LEGAL ABORTION 27-133 (3d ed. 2d printing 1983); Barrett & Guidotti, Induced Abortion: A Risk Factorfor PlacentaPrevia, 141 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 257 (1981); Beller,
Douglas, Kulker & Rosenberg, Consumptive CoagulopathyAssociated with Intra-AmnioticInfusion of HypertonicSalt, 112 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 534 (1972); Beric, Kupresanin &
Kapor-Stanulovic, Accidents and Sequelae of Medical Abortions, 116 AM. J. OBSTET.
GYNECOL. 813 (1973); Bulfin, Complications of Legal Abortion: A Perspective From Private
Practice, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 145 (T. Hilgers, D. Horan & D.
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psychological,2 4 1 and reproductive capability 24 2 categories do occur
Mall eds. 1981); Bulfin, A New Problem in Adolescent Gyneocology, 72 S. MED. J. 967 (1979);
Burkman, Atlenza & King, Culture and Treatment Results in Endometriosis FollowingElective Abortion, 128 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 556 (1977); Ferrari & Shollenberger, Abdominal Wall Endometriosis Following Hypertonic Saline Abortion, 238 J.A.M.A. 56 (1977);
Hilgers, The Medical Hazardsof Legally Induced Abortion, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 57-85 (D. Horan ed. reprint 1980); Iffy, Letters: Second-Trimester Abortions, 249
J.A.M.A. 588 (1983); Kimball, Hallum & Cates, Deaths Caused by Pulmonary Thromboembolism After Legally Induced Abortion, 132 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 169 (1978); Lowensohn & Hibbard, Laceration of the Ascending Branch of the UterineArtery: A Complication of
Therapeutic Abortion, 118 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 36 (1974); Nemec, Prendergast &
Trumbauer, Medical Abortion Complications: An Epidemiologic Study at a Mid-Missouri
Clinic, 51 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 433 (1978); Panayotou, Kaskarels, Mettinen, Trichopoulos &
Kalandidi, Induced Abortion and Ectopic Pregnancy, 114 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 507
(1972); Rubin, Cates, Gold, Rochat & Tyler, Fatal Ectopic PregnancyAfter Attempted Legally Induced Abortion, 244 J.A.M.A. 1705 (1980); White, Coe, Dworsley & Margolis, Disseminated IntravascularCoagulationFollowingMidtrimesterAbortions, 58 ANESTHESIOLOGY
99 (1983); cf. Cates, Legal Abortion: The Public Health Record, 215 SCIENCE 1586 (1982);
Grimes, Schultz, Cates & Tyler, Mid-TrimesterAbortion By Dilation andEvacuation: A Safe
and PracticalAlternative, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1141 (1977); WuIff, Elective Abortion:
Complications Seen in a Free-StandingClinic, 49 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 351 (1977).
241. See A. SALTENBERGER, supra note 240, at 135-55; S. KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 327-29 (1984); Sim, Abortion and the Psychiatrist,
20 BRIT. MED. J. 145 (July-Dec. 1963); Sim, Abortion and Psychiatry,in NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON HUMAN ABORTION 151, 155-58 (T. Hilgers, D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1981); Spaulding &
Cavenar, Psychoses Following Therapeutic Abortion, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 3 (1978);
Tishler, Adolescent Suicide Attempts Following Elective Abortion: A Special Case of Anniversary Reaction, 68 PEDIATRICS 670 (1981); cf. Ewing & Ravse, Therapeutic Abortion and a
Prior Psychiatric History, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 37 (1973); Ford, Castenuovo-Tedesco &
Lorg, Abortion: Is It a Therapeutic Procedure in Psychiatry?, 218 J.A.M.A. 1173 (1971);
Greenglass, Therapeutic Abortion and Psychiatric Disturbance in Canadian Women, 21 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRIC A.J. 453 (1976).
242. See 129 CONG. REC. S9270-72 (daily ed. June 28, 1983) (affidavit of Dr. Richard
Moutvic); Daling & Emanuel, Induced Abortion and Subsequent Outcome of Pregnancy in a
Series of American Woman, 297 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1241 (1977); Funderburk, Guttrie &
Meldrum, Suboptimal Pregnancy Outcome Among Women with PriorAbortions and Premature Births, 126 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 55 (1976); Harlap & Davies, Late Sequelae of
Induced Abortion: Complicationsand Outcome of Pregnancy and Labor, 102 AM. J. EPIDEM.
217 (1975); Harlap, A Prospective Study of SpontaneousFetalLosses After Induced Abortions,
301 N. ENG. J. MED. 677 (1979); Kline, Stein, Susuey & Warburton, Induced Abortion and
Spontaneous Abortion: No Connection?, 107 AM. J. EPIDEM. 290 (1978); Kline, Induced
Abortion and Subsequent Outcome of Pregnancy in a Series of American Women, 297 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1241 (1977); Latent Morbidity After Abortion, BRIT. MED. J. 506 (3 March
1973); Lembrych, Fertility ProblemsFollowing an Aborted First Pregnancy, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION, 128, 128-34 (T. Hilgers, D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1981);
Levin, Schoenbaum, Marisun, Stubblefeld & Ryan, Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent PregnancyLoss, 243 J.A.M.A. 2495 (1980); Madore, A Study on the Effects of Induced Abortion on Subsequent Pregnancy Outcome, 139 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 516
(1981); Pantelakis, Papadimitraus & Dexiadis, Influence of Induced and Spontaneous Abortions on the Outcome of Subsequent Pregnancies, 116 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 799 (1973);
Quick, Liberalized Abortion in Orgeon: Effects on Fertility, Prematurity, Fetal Death, and
Infant Death, 68 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1003 (1978); Richardson & Dixion, Effects of Legal
Termination on Subsequent Pregnancy, 29 BRIT. MED. J. 1303 (May 1976); Schoenbaum,
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with some frequency, justifying a requirement that physicians inform their patients about the medical complications and risks of
abortion. The common law imposes just such a requirment, even
with respect to abortion. In Reynier v. Delta Women's Clinic,
Inc.,243 for example, Mrs. Reynier sued an abortionist and an abortion clinic after having to undergo a hysterectomy following abortion complications. She alleged that the physician should have
informed her that uterine perforation was a possible risk of suction
abortion." The court described several elements which the plaintiff would have to prove for the doctrine of informed consent to
apply, including the principle that the physician must describe "all
risks which reasonably tend to affect the patient's decision."24' 5 The
court concluded that uterine perforation was a normal risk of abortion and, hence, should have been revealed.24 6 The astonishing result of the Supreme Court's decision in Thornburgh is that the
common law can require, based on the reasonable patient model,
that risks of abortion procedures be revealed, but that states are
constitutionally forbidden from codifying the same requirement in a
statute.
Abortion is not medically indicated but, rather, is prompted by
non-medical factors. As Justice Stevens has observed, "the most
significant consequences of the decision are not medical in character."24 7 Consequences of abortion indeed range far beyond the
medical and, therefore, support the reasonable patient model of informed consent. Because indications for and consequences of abortion are largely non-medical, information relating to these
considerations will likely be largely non-medical in nature. However, the non-medical nature of the information does not make it
less important or less relevent. But if, as the Court held in the
rather circular Thornburgh opinion, requiring that factual nonmedical information is unconstitutional because it is beyond the
physician's expertise, then information centrally relevant to the
abortion decision will likely never reach the women who supposedly
Outcome of the Delivery Following an Induced or Spontaneous Abortion, 136 AM. J. OBSTET.
GYNECOL. 19 (1980); Trichopoulos, Handanus, Danezis, Kalandidi & Kalaputhlzi, Induced
Abortion and Secondary Infertility, BRIT. J. OBSTET. GYNAECOL; Wynn & Wynn, Some Consequences of Induced Abortion to Children Born Subsequently, 4 MARRAGE & FAMILY
NEWSLETTER (Feb.-April 1973).
243. 359 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 1978).
244. Id. at 737.
245. Id. at 737-38.
246. Id. at 737.
247. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 103 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have the right of choice in the first place. It is the reasonable patient model, with its touchstone of materiality, that allows for or
can require the disclosure of relevant though non-medical information by the physician.
This discussion leads to two conclusions. First, the Court's
insistence on the reasonable physician model is misplaced since
so much of what goes into and results from the abortion decision
is non-medical in nature. Second, the Court's hostility to state
measures designed to ensure informed consent is inappropriate.
This conclusion is true for several reasons. First, it prevents relevant non-medical information from entering into each woman's
consideration. Second, it prevents medical information about factors relevant to the decision but not directly related to the woman's
own health from being considered. Finally, it looks at the physician's discretion rather than the woman's decision. As Justice Stevens has stated:
even doctors are not omniscient; specialists in performing abortions may incorrectly conclude that the immediate advantages of
the procedure outweigh the disadvantages ....

In each individ-

ual case factors much more profound than a mere medical judgment may weigh heavily in the scales. The overriding
consideration is that24the
right to make the choice be exercised as
8
wisely as possible.",

The nature of abortion, its indications, and consequences support the reasonable patient model of informed consent. The many
non-medical factors involved and the nature of the right as one of
personal choice also argue for this model. The Court's "unduly
burdensome" standard is also fully consistent with this model, because it keeps the focus on the woman and her right of choice, and
avoids making physicians' preferences or comfort the touchstone of
constitutionality. The reality of the context in which the abortion
right is exercised makes this all the more important.
C.

The Abortion Context

The final piece to the puzzle is an assessment of the reality of the
context in which the abortion right is sought to be exercised. The
Supreme Court has placed obvious emphasis on real-life situations
when creating the abortion right in the first place. Its broad definition of "health" testifies to this. This examination of the real context in which the abortion right is sought to be exercised is, then,
particularly appropriate. It supports the developing conclusion that
248.

Id. at 104.
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the Court's assumption of thorough physician involvement in the
abortion decision is illusory. Rather, the reality of this context supports the reasonable patient model of informed consent because the
physician is rarely, if ever, involved in the decision-making. As the
court in Fitzpatrick observed, informed consent requirements are
suggested "by the realities of the system that provides abortions."2 49
Especially in free-standing abortion clinics, which perform a large
majority of abortions, the physician is a technician only. Those settings are not places in which to decide whether or not to get an
abortion; they are settings in which to have the actual abortion performed. No one goes to the grocery store to decide whether or not
to buy groceries. People go to grocery stores to buy groceries after
having made their decision to do so. Likewise, abortionists sell
abortions. The Supreme Court's hostility to state measures protecting some minimal level of decision-making integrity is based on a
skewed vision of reality.
The Court's abortion decisions repeatedly reflect a view that the
physician either is or ought to be involved in both the making and
the effectuating of the abortion decision. ° Reality is much different. The physician actually participates in the making of the abortion decision in perhaps only one percent of the cases.2 5I Despite its
professed preference for physician involvement in the 1983 Akron
decision, the Court actually began to hold that no physician need be
involved in the decision-making at all. Because other personnel can
do this, the physician need only ensure that some disclosure is
made.2 52
249. Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 587 (1975).
250. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427
(1983); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 61 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). See also Stone, supra note 5, at
580: "The language of the [Roe] decision throughout misleadingly suggests that some crucial
sort of medical judgement is involved not only in how the abortion is performed but whether
the pregnancy 'should be terminated.' " Id.
251. 129 CONG. REc. S9124 (daily ed. June 27, 1983). See also Hearings,supra note 11,
at 172 (Testimony of Dr. Bernard N. Nathanson: "The doctor is nothing more than an
instrument of her will .... There is no physician input into the decision making process in
permissive abortion .... The physician is not involved in decision making here."); Nathanson, Deeper IntoAbortion, 291 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1189, 1189 (1974) ("The phrase between a
woman and her physician' is an empty one since the physician is only the instrument of her
decision."); Stone, supra note 5, at 581 ("The physician is more appropriately characterized
as a technician in an assembly line than an attending physician."); Zekman & Warrieck, The
Abortion Lottery, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 1 ("When a woman goes to an
abortion clinic, she entrusts her body to strangers-doctors she knows nothing about, doctors
she has never met.").
252. Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 448-49 (1983).
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The reality, again, is different. The problem is not so much who
gives out information; the problem is that no one gives it out at all
or, if someone does, inadequate information is given. Women receive little counseling or information when making the abortion decision, particularly in the many free-standing clinics which exist for
the sole purpose of performing abortions for profit. This assertion
should not surprise many people and some courts have actually recognized this fact. On the basis of stipulated facts, one court noted:
Women who undergo abortions are not always told of the alternatives to abortion or of the full nature and effect of the procedure they will undergo ....

In fact, some of the women who

undergo abortions would not have had an abortion if they were
provided with all the information to be provided by the [statute
being challenged].2 53
Dissenting from the invalidation of a rather detailed informed consent statute, a federal appellate judge wrote:
The evidence presented at trial showed that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was made not by the woman in conjunction
with her physician, but by the woman and lay employees of the
abortion clinic, the income of which is dependent upon the woman's choosing to have an abortion. The testimony disclosed
that the doctors at [the] clinic did little, if2any,
54 counseling before
seeing the patient in the procedure room.
Similar situations have been cited in the popular media and welldocumented by researchers.2
Under these conditions, disclosure of information making abortion a more attractive option is much more likely than disclosure of
information making it less attractive. Again,. this assertion should
surprise no one. An abortion clinic sells abortions. Information
downplaying the attractiveness of this product and suggesting that
other options are more readily available than a woman might have
thought are hardly likely to be presented absent some incentive. Informed consent statutes can play this role.
The picture that emerges is of a procedure performed by medical personnel, for their own profit, which is not medically indicated
but is instead the product of many non-medical factors and about
253. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp.
791, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
254. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1217 (6th
Cir. 1981) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. In 1978, Pamela Zekman and Pamela Warrick conducted a five-month investigation
of four abortion clinics in Chicago, sponsored by the Chicago Sun-Times and the Better Government Association. The results became a Pulitzer Prize-winning series, The Abortion
Profiteers, appearing in the Sun-Times during November 1978.
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which little information (especially information which would enhance other options, make abortion less attractive, or is largely nonmedical) is voluntarily made available. This picture is fully consistent with, and even demands application of, the reasonable patient
model of informed consent. 56 This model increases, rather than
decreases, the state's interest in ensuring the integrity of the abortion decision by having certain information considered when that
decision is made. 57 It decreases, rather than increases, the physician's involvement and the deference to be given his judgment. Finally, this model supports using the same broad definition of
"health" to justify informed consent provisions as is used to describe a woman's reasons for choosing abortion. The former should
respond to the latter.
V.

A NEW FRAMEWORK

It is apparent that the Supreme Court's approach to informed
consent statutes in the abortion context is inappropriate. By using
the effect of informed consent requirements on the physician's discretion as the touchstone of constitutionality, this approach ignores
traditional jurisprudence on public control of the medical profession as well as the role of the state and trend in the law of informed
consent generally. By failing to apply the unduly burdensome test
with proper reference to the true nature of the abortion right, the
nature of abortion, and the reality of the abortion context, the
Court improperly invalidates many legitimate informed consent
provisions. Furthermore, this approach unnecessarily prevents
states from protecting the integrity of the abortion decision-making
process and from properly asserting important state interests in maternal health and preborn life.
A framework which takes these factors into account would include four basic elements. The first is a focus on the woman, rather
than a focus on the physician. Physicians enjoy no independent
256. See supra notes 155-172 and accompanying text. Professor Stone writes that "to the
extent [Roe and Doe] involved factual inferences about medical standards and medical practice-inferences which suggested a context for the decision, inferences which suggested more
limited consequences of the decision, inferences which suggested the realities of medical practice-to that extent, the decision was quite misleading." Stone, supra note 5, at 581. He calls
Roe and Doe "flawed decisions" and emphasizes that "[it was Blackmun and Burger who
were out of touch with reality if they honestly believed what they wrote." Id. His references
above to the context, consequences, and realities of the abortion decision closely resemble the
approach taken in this article.
257. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 421-23 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 103 (1976).
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constitutional right to practice medicine free from state interference. Rather, the abortion right belongs solely to the woman and
any physician "right" is solely derivative therefrom. The woman's
right is one of choice, and informed consent provisions should be
evaluated strictly with reference to their impact on that interest.25 8
In light of the fact that abortion is most often not medically indicated, the Court should emphasize criteria such as the autonomy of
the woman, the integrity of her decision, and the materiality of information as relevant criteria.
Second, the test for evaluating an informed consent provision
should be whether it unduly burdens the abortion right just described. The Court should maintain a distinction between absolute
and relative burdens 25 9 so that the physician's discretion does not
again become the touchstone of constitutionality. Only when a regulation unduly burdens the abortion right should it be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny.2 6 °
Third, the determination of whether an informed consent statute unduly burdens the abortion right should be made on the basis
of the reasonable patient model. Abortion is not medically indicated in most cases. The Supreme Court has held that a state need
not treat abortion like other medical procedures because abortion
involves the termination of preborn human life. 26 1 The materiality
of information to the woman's decision is most important. In addition, because of the profit-making nature of the abortion context
and many well-documented instances of manipulation and lack of
adequate counseling in that context, 262 the concern over "the danger that physicians [or their surrogates] will exploit patients by subjecting them to treatment that is not in their best interests"26' 3 is
258. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977).
259. See supranotes 208-23 and accompanying text for an explanation of this distinction.
See also Pearson & Kurtz, The Abortion Controversy: A Story in Law and Politics, 8 HARV.
J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 427, 431, 433 (1985) (distinction drawn between "power investiture" and
"burden creation"). Even though the Court does not consistently use the "unduly burdensome" test, it has used this formulation more often in its later cases. Cases involving either
state-created obstacles or less burdensome regulations can be analyzed under this test.
260. Professor Wardle's conclusion is similar. He states that the standard should be that
"since (or so long as) as informed consent requirement does not constitute an undue burden
or barrier ... to exercising the right of a pregnancy [sic] woman to choose her course of
conduct, the particular statute should be upheld if it is rationally related ... to a legitimate
state interest ... even if, on close examination, the statute may contain some ambiguous,
questionable or unwise provisions." L. WARDLE supra note 5, at 92.
261. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977).
262. See generally supra notes 249-255 and accompanying text.
263. Comment, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient Participationin Medical
Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 172, 175 (1981).
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acutely real. The district court in Danforth upheld the general requirement of obtaining written informed consent because it "insures
that the pregnant woman retains control over the discretions of her
consulting physician. '
The Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions increasingly
emphasize that more, rather than less, disclosure is necessary in a
consumer/contract environment. Abortion services are sought and
delivered in just such an environment. As long as information is
not false or deceptive, it should be provided whether or not the professional involved would prefer otherwise. It may be that either the
form or content of information required by a particular informed
consent provision makes compliance unduly burdensome because
the information is factually incorrect, deceptive, or inflammatory in
nature. These may constitute undue burdens. But when information simply affects a decision, or has a potential for making one or
the other option more or less attractive, no reason for constitutionally forbidding its disclosure exists. Physicians can remain free, as
under the Akron ordinance, to make the required standardized information more relevent to individual patients' situations.
Finally, this framework should utilize a definition of "health" as
a basis for informed consent provisions consistent with the breadth
given to that term when used with reference to the exercise of the
abortion right itself. Most of the indications for and many of the
consequences of abortion are non-medical but yet are highly relevant to a woman's lifestyle and overall well-being. It makes no
sense to continue imposing this unjustified radical dichotomy of definitions. The information about alternatives such as financial assistance for the childbirth option, risks, and the like required by the
statutes the Supreme Court invalidated in Akron and Thornburgh,
parallel quite closely some of the very concerns listed in the
Supreme Court's opinions that might make women consider abortion.2 65 A workable doctrinal framework within which to decide
264. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
265. For example, information about the complications of abortion and the risks of the
particular procedure to be employed, Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2178, could be weighed
against the "harm medically diagnosable" that pregnancy might entail. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Information about medical assistance benefits for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care,
Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2179, would seem particularly relevant to the family concerned
about financial inability to care for another child. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Information about
alternatives to abortion like adoption, Thornburgh, 106 S.Ct. at 2179, may be very relevant
to women who are faced with "a distressful life and future" with another child but who fear
the same result were they to live with the knowledge that they have aborted a child. Roe, 410
U.S. at 153.
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cases involving competing interests, rather than insisting on unprincipled results on the judicial force of stare decisis alone, will require
a change in the Court's framework.
This framework will allow states to require disclosure of more
kinds of information with more specificity than the Court has allowed to date. Accurate information about the preborn child, for
example, would likely be permissible. One should again note that
the presence of the prebom child makes abortion different from
other medical procedures and from other situations involving the
right to privacy.26 6 Polls consistently show that women believe life
begins at an earlier point than do men 267 and that new scientific
information about the fetus has an impact on attitudes toward abortion.26 s Whether the fetus is viewed as a "blob of jelly ' 26 9 or as a
recognizable member of the human species with human characteristics and abilities is material to the decision whether to abort it or
carry it to term. Such information may be more relevant to women
who have not yet finally decided whether to obtain an abortion, but
it is important to remember that the choice between abortion and
childbirth is the core of the abortion right. The right not to have an
abortion is at least as fundamental as the right to have one.27 ° Information about prenatal human development has been widely documented, is commonly understood throughout the medical
community, and can readily be put into understandable layman's
terms.2 7 ' The Court's invalidation of the disclosure requirement in
Thornburgh, because such information may not be relevant to all
women, is without justification. The same conclusion may be made
266. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
267. See Blake, The Supreme Court's Abortion Decisions and PublicOpinion in the United
States, 4 HUMAN LIFE REV. 64, 73 (Winter 1978); R. Adamek, ABORTION AND PUBLIC
OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1982); S.Rep. No. 465, supra note 239, at 48.
268. See Beck, America's Abortion Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at 22 (results of
Gallup poll also showing that 38% of Americans doubt their position on abortion).

269. This is how the fetus is described in many so-called "counseling" sessions at abortion clinics. See, e.g., Eight Other Women's Stories, PEOPLE, Aug. 5, 1985, at 83 (account by
Lorijo Nerad).

270. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977).
271. See L.B. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY (7th ed. 1975); G. BERGEL & C.E.
Koop, WHEN YOU WERE FORMED IN SECRET (1980); R. RUGH & L. SHETTLE, FROM
CONCEPTION TO BIRTH: THE DRAMA OF LIFE'S BEGINNINGS (1971); L. SHETTLES & D.
RORVICK, RITES OF LIFE: THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE FOR LIFE BEFORE BIRTH (1983);

Blechschmide, Human Being From the Very First, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
ABORTION 6-28 (T. Hilgers, D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1981); Heffernan, The Early Biography
of Everyman, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 3-25 (T. Hilgers & D. Horan eds. reprint

1980); Koop, The Right to Live, 1 HUMAN LIFE REV. 70 (Fall 1975); The Beginning of
Human Life, 10 STUDIES IN LAW & MEDICINE (1982).
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concerning the holding of the court in Planned Parenthoodv. Bellotti2 72 that such information "is not directly material to any medically relevant fact, and thus does not serve the concern for
providing adequate medical information that lies at the heart of the
informed consent requirement."27' 3 Materiality to a woman's abortion decision is the heart of the requirement. Non-medical information, or medical information relating to non-medical factors, may
yet be highly relevant, even vitally important. As such, a state
should have the freedom to require that this information be disclosed so that it may also be considered.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's abortion doctrine is fraught with confusion, stemming from a variety of sources. This confusion is apparent in the area of informed consent to abortion statutes, particularly
concerning the Court's willingness to strike down these requirements because of their impact on the physician's discretion. This
approach ignores traditional jurisprudence on the public control of
the medical profession and the Court's rejection of the notion that
physicians have a constitutionally significant right to practice
medicine free from state interference. It also ignores the law of informed consent outside the abortion context, and its trend away
from the reasonable physician model, which the Court contends is
constitutionally mandated within that context, and toward the reasonable patient model, which many compelling reasons support as
appropriate for abortion information disclosure. The Court's view
that these provisions interfere with the woman's right ignores the
nature of that abortion right, the nature, and the abortion context.
All of these factors support a framework other than that which the
Court has used to date in evaluating the constitutionality of informed consent to abortion statutes. Consideration of these factors
would probably produce different results.
Such a framework would focus on the woman rather than the
physician, would consistently use the "unduly burdensome" test
based on the reasonable physician model, and would use a definition
of "health" underlying informed consent requirements which was
broad enough to include the integrity of the decision.
This refinement would not only make some sense out of the confusion, and allow more consistent application of identifiable princi272. 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981).
273. Id. at 1021.
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pies, but it would allow states more room to preserve the integrity
of the choice between abortion and childbirth and to pursue its legitimately important interests implicated in that choice.

